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Abstract 
This work takes up the task to present and discuss in more detail certain 
aspects of Islamisation in the Ottoman Balkans that have been left unsatisfactorily 
studied up to now. Utilising petitions for converison to Islam (kisve hahasi arzuha/s) 
in combination with other supporting primary sources, it is meant to cast more light 
upon the actual mechanisms of conversion, patterns of motivation, as well as the 
possible factors that conditioned the process of lslamisation in the Ottoman Balkans 
during the late 17th and the first half of the 18th cc. and to show that at least in the light 
of these documents Balkan lslamisation during the period in question was a gradual 
process influenced by a complex set of factors, whereby fiscal pressure and the quest 
for social advancement played a prominent role. Lastly, post-conversion socio-
religious practices as well as the multifaceted attitude of the Ottoman state and 
Islamic legal tradition towards "new Muslims" will be discussed. 
Introduction 
Islamisation processes in the Balkans have quite naturally attracted the 
attention of historians from the Balkans and the world over. A natural explanation for 
this interest is to be found in the fact that the Ottoman-Turkic colonization, the 
penetration and spread of Islam, and conversion in particular, apart from being 
important aspects of the demographic and religious history of the Ottoman Balkans, 
are also an indispensable part of the Balkan peoples' lasting historical memories. As 
of today, there exist numerically considerable Muslim minorities - Slavic and Turkish 
speaking alike - and their ethnogenesis continues to be a subject of heated debates 
and numerous hypotheses. Research work on this problematics has often been 
negatively affected by the fact that the explanation of Islamisation processes in the 
region has most of the time been directly related to the formation of national identities 
and national state doctrines in the newly formed Balkan nation-states at the end of the 
19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries; research on the topic has also been used 
to serve the general political interests or to justify concrete policies pursued by 
dictatorial (communist) regimes that prevailed over most of the Balkans during the 
second half of the 201h century. 
Thus, a great portion of the works devoted to Balkan Islamisation (especially 
those written by historians from the Balkans) have been the product of what E. 
Radushev has termed as "the national revivalist - mythological approach" which 
renders Balkan Islamisation as forcible mass conversion of Balkan Christian 
population accompanied by state coordinated severe punitive campaigns. This 
approach has appeared "effective" as it provided easily understandable and acceptable 
explanations in the context of the notions of Ottoman domination, already established 
in the local folklore tradition and national revivalist historiography. 1 
Local Balkan historians have most often been concerned with the historical 
consequences of Islamisation and conversion, the "negative" role the latter played in 
the development of the Balkan peoples and the respective demographic changes they 
have brought about as a final result. The spread of Islam has often been linked to the 
arrest of the spiritual development and the relatively late formation of the national 
consciousness of the local Balkan peoples, and even to the Balkan countries' 
considerable lag in respect to economic development as compared to those of Central 
and Western Europe. The natural syncretism of the various cultural influences which 
coexisted in the Ottoman Balkans for centuries on end have posed additional 
problems to historians, and especially to those who have approached Balkan 
Islamisation with politically presupposed conclusions in mind. 
The most recent manifestation of historical research and writing's being 
manipulated for the purpose of justifying extreme political measures, was the so 
called "revival process" in Bulgaria between 1984 and 1989. Under extreme political 
pressure on behalf of Bulgaria's communist regime, the efforts of a host of Bulgarian 
orientalists were geared on the propounding of rather implausible explanations of the 
existence of Bulgaria's Muslim minorities, Slavic and Turkish speaking alike. 
Untenable theories ranged from presenting Bulgarian Turks as ''Turkic speaking 
Muslim Bulgarians" (sic) whose historical roots lay in pre-Ottoman developments, to 
rendering the existence of Bulgaria's Muslim communities as a result of coordinated 
1 E. Radushev, "Demografski I etno-religiozni protsesi v zapadnite Rodopi prez 15-18ti vek" 
(Demographic and Ethno-religious Processes in the Western Rodhopes during 15-18"' centuries), 
/storichesko Badeshte, 1998, No. 1, Sofia. 
2 
assimilation policies on behalf of the Ottoman state, which, being viewed as "a 
mistake of history", called for an apposite redress. 2 
Be it as it may, the specifics and functional nature of Islamisation in the 
different regions of the Balkans and during the different periods of Ottoman rule have 
been unsatisfactorily studied. Antonina Zheliazkova has provided us with the only 
existing study, that has attempted to address Balkan Islamisation on a large scale.3 
Beside presenting a broad picture of the process of Islamisation in the Western Balkan 
lands, Zheliazkova's study is the first and only one that has utilized petitions 
(arzuhals) for conversion to Islam in a scholarly and objective manner.4 Still, given 
the nature of her work, A. Zheliazkova did not study and analyze this type of 
documents in detail, but only used them to present a broad picture of Balkan 
Islamisation, together with a large number of other documents, without discussing 
sufficiently the motivation patterns which the arzuhals disclose, and making virtually 
no attempt to link them to the problems of conversion and apostacy in the light of 
Islamic legal tradition. A circumstance that objectively limited the scope of analysis 
of this work is that, although published in 1990, it was also written in Bulgaria during 
the years of the "revival process", when access to certain archival units and secondary 
literature was limited, and censorship (and even more importantly, autocensorship) 
exerted a great deal of pressure upon a historian's state of mind. 
2 See Dimitrov, S., "Nyakoi problemi na etnicheskite i islyamizatsionno-asimilatsionnite protsesi v 
Balgarskite zemi prez XV-XVII v.", Problemi na Balgarskata narodnost I natsia, No. 3, Sofia, 1987, 
EP· 33-56. 
3 Zhaliazkova, A, Razprostranenie na Jslyama v 7.apadnobalkanskite Zemi pod Osmanska Vlast, XV-
XVIJI vek, (The Spread of Islam in the Western Balkan Lands under Ottoman Rule, 15th -18th 
Centuries), Sofia: BAN, 1990. 
4 In fact, the first scholarly work in which such petitions were brought to attention is Asparuh Velkov 
and Evgeni Radushev's article "Osmanski Arhivni darzhavni Dokumenti za Islyamizatsionnite Protsesi 
na Balkanite, XIV - XIX v.", in Problemi na Razvitieto na Balgarskata Narodnost I Natsia, No. 3, 
Sofia, 1987, pp., 57-73. This article, however, was meant to serve the political objectives set by the 
Bulgarian communist regime in relation to the "revival process", and did not do much more than 
presenting the above mentioned petitions as "one more proof of the coercive assimilation policies of 
the Ottoman state". 
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In addition to A. Zheliazkova' s work, there exist a few studies devoted 
particularly to Balkan Islamisation. Two names that readily come to mind in this 
respect are those of Machiel Kiel and Strashimir Dimitrov. Both have produced 
valuable studies dealing with Islamisation in geographically limited regions in 
Ottoman Bulgaria. M. Kiel studied ethno-religious processes in the kazas of Selvi 
(modem Sevlievo, in North Central Bulgaria) and Nevrekob (modem Nevrokop, 
Sowthwestem Bulgaria), while S. Dimitrov dealt with the Mesta valley (Western 
Rodhopes).5 Both authors have based their studies on Ottoman fiscal registers (tahrir, 
cizye, and avariz defterleri) and have generally reached similar conclusions -- namely 
that Islamisation in the respective regions they studied was a gradual process, and not 
one related to forced mass conversion. Both studies were prepared with the aim to 
establish exactly whether this was true or not, and especially as M. Kiel's work is 
concerned, it was meant to be an attack against nationalistic Bulgarian historiography 
of the period of the Revival process. However, although both articles are of very high 
scholarly value, they do not provide us with much insights with regard to the actual 
mechanisms of Islamisation. Ottoman fiscal registers may provide a fairly reliable 
picture of demographic and ethno-religious changes, but they can hardly help to 
explain them. 
Besides, Ottomanists from the Balkans, Turkey, and the world over, have 
presented us with a considerable number of works that touch upon various historical 
processes and phenomena, which relate to Islamisation in one way or another. 
Eminent Turkish historians, such as 6. L. Barkan, I. H. Uzun~ar~1h, M. T. Gokbigin, 
5 Kiel, Machiel, Razprostranenie na lslyama v balgarskoto selo rpez Osmanskata epoha (XV-XVIII v.), 
kolonizatsiya i islyamizatsiya, Sofia: IMIR, 1998, pp. 56-126, Strashimir Dimitrov, "Demografskite 
otnosheniya i pronikvaneto na Islyama va Zapadnite Rodopi I dolinata na reka Mesta prez XV-XVII 
v.",Rodopski Sbomik, vol. 1, Sofia, 1965, see also Kiel, M., "Urban Development in Bulgaria in the 
Turkish Period", Karpat, Kemal, ed., the Turks of Bulgaria. The History, Culture, and Political Life of 
a Minority, Istanbul, 1990, pp.79-158. 
4 
and H. Inalcik have achieved a lot in casting more light upon the demographic 
changes that took place in the Ottoman Balkans. In a way, however, they have 
underestimated the extent and importance of individual and small group conversion to 
Islam on behalf of the local Balkan population, and have placed excessive emphasis 
on the role of Turkic colonization as conditioned by Ottoman centralism. 6 
The same prominent Turkish scholars, together with a number of historians 
from the Balkans, such as V. Mutafchieva, B. Cvetkova, M. Sokoloski, A. Matkovski, 
A. Suceska, N. Filipovic, H. Sabanovic, and D. Bojanic-Lukac, to mention just but a 
few, have exerted considerable efforts in establishing and clarifying the major features 
of the Ottoman agrarian regime during the first centuries of Ottoman rule in the 
Balkans.7 Unlike the classical age, the 17th and 18th centuries have been insufficiently 
researched. Among the few important contributions in respect to Ottoman socio-
economic history are those of E. Radushev, M. Akdag, and Y. Ozkaya. 8 
Among the more specific issues that relate to the process of Islamisation in the 
Ottoman Balkans are the collection of cizye, cryptochristianity, and conversion and 
apostacy as viewed by the Ottoman state, and in the context of Islamic legal tradition. 
Although, cizye and its collection occupied a substantial place in the non-
Muslims' fiscal burden and were a considerable source of income for the imperial 
treasury, few studies have been exclusively devoted to this problem.9 
6 A noteworthy example in this respect is 0. L. Barkan's arttcle "Osmanh imparatorlugunda bir iskan 
ve kolonizasyon metodu olarak stirgilnler'', j(jjFM 15, 1953-54. 
77 Most important in this respect are the numerous studies of Prof. H. lnalcik, see also V Mutafchieva, 
Agrarnite otnoshenia v Osmanskata imperia prez XV-XVI v., Sofia, 1962, B. Cvetkova, "Prinos kam 
izuchavaneto na turskiya feodalizm v balgarskite zemi prez XV-XVI v.", IIBI, 5-6, 1954, 0. L. Barkan, 
XV ve XVI Aszrlarmda Osman/1 lmparatorlugunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali esas/arz, istanbul, 
1943. 
8 See E. Radushev, Agrarnite institutsii v Osmanskata imperia prez XVII-XVIII vek, Sofia: 
Akademichno Izdatelstvo "Prof. Marin Drinov'', 1995, Akdag, M. "Genel <;izgileriyle XVII Yiizy1l 
Tilrkiye Tarihi", TAD, 1966, 6-7, Y. Ozkaya, Osmanlz jmparatorlugunda Ayanlzk, Ankara: THK 
Bas1mevi, 1994. 
9 See, H. Hadzibegic, Glavarina u Osmanskoj Drzavi, Sarajevo, 1966, B. Nedkoff, Die Gizya 
(Kopfsteuer) im Osmanischen Reich. Mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung von Bulgarien, Leipzig, 1942, 
5 
Unlike cizye, in the case of cryptocristianity there are not many pnmary 
sources that could be utilized to provide for a comprehensive investigation of this 
phenomenon, hence, the small number of studies that have addressed the isuue does 
not come as a surprise. Worth mentioning are the articles of S. Skendi, P. Bartl, and 
S. Dimitrov. 10 
S. Dimitrov has also sontributed to the study of conversion and apostacy in the 
context of Islamic legal tradition. 11 However, many of his conclusions, which will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the present study, are rather exaggerated and far-
fetched. 
Given the state of modern scholarship, the present study will take up the task 
to discuss certain aspects of Islamisation on the basis of the above mentioned petitions 
(arzuhals) for conversion to Islam, which roughly cover the period 1670-1750. As 
this type of sources does possess certain shortcomings (namely, the region and place 
from which the petitioners come are seldom indicated, as is their respective social 
status), the study will concern itself primarily with the shedding of more light upon 
patterns of motivation of the petitioners and the respective factors that conditioned the 
former, and will also discuss a number of issues related to Islamisation in the light of 
these documents -was conversion forced or voluntary, what was the attitude of the 
Ottoman state towards new converts, and what views did Islamic legal tradition hold 
in the same respect. 
E. Grozdanova, "Sabiraneto na danaka cizye v Balgarskite zemi prez XVII I XVIII v., Istoricheski 
Pregled, 1970, No. 5, pp. 75-90. 
JO S. Skendi, "Cryptochristianity among the Balkan Peoples under the Ottomans", Actes du /er 
Congres International des etudes balkaniques et sud-est Europeennes, vol. 3., Sofia, 1969, P. Bartl, 
"Kriptokristentum und Formen des religiosen Synkretismus in Albanien", Beitrage zur Kentniss 
Sudosteuropas und des Nahen Orients, vol. 2, Mtinchen, 1967, S. Dimitrov, "Skritoto hristianstvo i 
islyamizatsionnite protsesi v Osmanskata darzhava", Istoricheski Pregled, 1987, No. 3., pp. 19-33 
11 S. Dimitrov, "Fetvi zaizkorenyavane na balgarskata hristianska pravoslavna mirogledna sistema sred 
pomohamedanchenite balgari", Vekove, 1987, No. 2, pp. 27-39. 
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Chapter 1: Historical Overview (1670-1750) 
The period in question falls into a broader one, from the late 16th to the late 
18th (i.e. up to the first attempts at outright Westernization during the reign of Selim 
Ill), which is generally viewed by modern scholarship as a period of a steady decline 
and a definitive transformation of Ottoman state and society. Whilst the "decline" 
paradigm, being value judgement bound, has mislead a good number of scholars into 
making rather naive and often emotional simplifications, the concept of 
transformation, as it alludes, by itself, to the dynamism and fluidity of the historical 
process, does provide a valuable point of departure for an analysis of the profound 
changes the Ottoman world underwent in respect to virtually all the significant 
components of its complex nature - the formation and composition of central and 
provincial elites, as well as their interaction with the ruling dynasty, military 
organization, fiscal and landholding regimes, rea 'ya-askeri and Muslim-zimmi 
relations, as well as the Empire's changing position within the framework of the 
international balance of power. 
Hence, following the above mentioned notion of historical transformation, this 
introductory chapter will have the aim to succinctly outline the above mentioned 
changes (with limiting the analysis to the 1670 -1750 period where possible) for the 
purpose of providing the reader with the apposite understanding of the historical 
background in relation to Muslim-zimmi relations and Balkan Islamisation, certain 
aspects of which will be the focus of this study. 
In order to get a better idea of the transformation that took place in the 
Ottoman empire during the 17-1 Sth centuries, a brief sketch of its major features 
during the so called "classical" period (1300 - 1600) appears to be in place. 
8 
The first three centuries in Ottoman history were characterised above all by a 
considerable degree of socio-economic stability and a relatively well established 
consensus among the members of the ruling elite in respect to the use and delegation 
of imperial authority12, which rested with an able ruler of charismatic leadership 
qualities. Thus, during this period, the Ottoman empire embodied in itself the major 
characteristics of the classical Perso-Islamic state model, possessing a highly 
centralised social structure. The political, social, and economic boundaries among the 
different social orders (tabaka), and more generally between rea 'ya and askeri, were 
strictly delineated with regard to their respective functions, privileges, and duties, 
which, by itself, kept social mobility at a fairly low level. The latter contention, 
however, does not aim at likening Ottoman social structure during the Classical 
period to a rigid caste system. There existed a certain degree of social mobility, 
related to the possibility of being enrolled in the military by a special decree of the 
sultan, the existence of certain groups of reaya with special functions (muaf ve 
musellem) and therefore exempt from extraordinary levies, as well as from land taxes, 
and in exceptional cases even from religious taxes13. Worth mentioning is also the 
gradual incorporation of pre-Ottoman military groups into the askeri class and 
dev§irme recruitment. 14 
The askeri class consisted of three main groups - the kap1kulus (slaves of the 
Porte), the ulema, and the provincial cavalrymen (sipahi). During the classical period 
kapikulus were mainly recruited through dev§irme - a levy of boys imposed upon 
Christian rural population for services at the palace or the divisions of the standing 
12 Abou EJ-Hadj, Rifa'at 'Ali, Formation of the Modem State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to 
Eighteenth Centuries, Albany: SUNY Press, 1991, p.15 
13 lnalcik, Halil, "Osmanlilar'da Rayyet Rusumu", in Osmanli lmparatorlugu: Toplum ve Economi, 
Istanbul: Eren, 1993, p. 52. 
14 Inalcik, Halil, Donald Quataert, eds., A social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire: 1300-
1914 . ._ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 16-17. 
9 
army of the Porte. After receiving initial education they were assigned to posts in the 
palace, or, as it was the case for most of them, filled the ranks of the Janissaries 
Corps. Some of them left the palace to serve as provincial governors (sancakbeyis 
and berleybeyis) and return at a later stage in their lives as viziers in the central 
government. It is worth noting that although, as already mentioned, there existed a 
fairly stable consensus among the ruling elites with regard to coercive power, there 
did appear considerable tensions between kapikulus and the ulema (the learned 
professions) in respect to their participation in government at both the central and 
provincial levels. 
The timar-holding sipahi formed the backbone of the Ottoman army during 
the classical period, a major part - 30 to 40 percent - of the military expenses was met 
by way of timar assignments, that is through the collection of state taxes by the 
sipahis from timars assigned to them in the provinces. 15 Thus, aside from being 
responsible to participate in military campaigns together with a specific number of 
cebelliis, (fully armed retainers) according to the size of the attained fief, sipahi 
performed essential administrative functions, such as tax collection (from the peasants 
living on the territory of their fiefs) and the ensuring of order within the territories of 
the fiefs assigned to them. Although, timar fiefs were in practice hereditary during 
the classical age they were not owned by the timariots, but were allotted from the miri 
(state lands) fund. Moreover, timar (and also zeamet) fiefs were assigned as a 
taxable unit, it was the fiefs tax revenue that a sipahi was entitled to collect in 
exchange for performing specified military and administrative duties, the specifics 
and duration of timar appointments depended solely on the central authority.. Apart 
15 lnalcik, Halil, "Military and Fiscal Transformation I The Ottoman Empire: 1600-1700, Archivum 
Ottomanicum, VI, p.311. 
10 
from cultivating a small (core) unit of land assigned to them personally for their own 
subsistence, they were not interested much in engaging in agricultural production. 
The rest of the lands of a timar fief were allotted to rea 'ya peasants through 
tapu contracts in the form of ~iftlik or ba§tina units and paid ~ift-resmi or ispen~e 
taxes over the land they cultivated. While the state kept its dominium eminens 
(rakaba) - proprietary rights -- over its lands, the peasants enjoyed the usus and the 
usufruct over the lands they cultivated16, and thus enjoyed in effect relative freedom 
under the fairly stable system of check and balances the centralised Ottoman state was 
able to maintain in order to curb the powers of local officials. 
Apart from this, tax farming (mukataa leases) was not wide spread in respect 
to agricultural lands, and moreover, the activities of the miiltezims (tax-farmers) were 
subject to strict control. The proportion of privately owned lands (miilks and vakfs) 
was kept low. All important practices in respect to landholding and urban economic 
life were codified in the form of sancak kanunnameleri, and conformity to these 
centrally imposed regulations was insisted without exception. 17 A similar attempt at 
codification in respect to the activities of state officials was to be seen in the te§kilat 
kanunu enacted by Mehmed 1118. 
As far as the Ottoman Balkans are concerned, the classical period was one of 
mutual adaptation, both for the Ottoman conquerors and the Balkan subject peoples, 
to the newly emerging conditions. The Ottoman state proved pragmatic enough to 
gradually incorporate and codify all the social, economic and legal practices of its 
new Balkan subjects, provided that the former did not contradict the basic tenets of 
Islamic law and did not affect negatively the interests of the Ottoman state. In a 
16 Inalcik, Halil, "A Social and Economic History ... ", pp. 104-105. 
17 El-Hadj, "The Formation .. ", p.12. 
18 Inalcik, Halil, "Osmanli Hukukuna Girl~", in Osmanlz lmparatorlugu: Toplum ve Ekonomi, Istanbul: 
Eren, 1994, p. 328. 
11 
seminal article, Prof. Halil Inalcik has outlined the mechanisms of integration of 
Balkan feudal elites into the centralized Ottoman system. A considerable number of 
members of pre-Ottoman Balkan feudal elites were assigned timar fiefs and were at 
the same time permitted to preserve their Christian religion, on the only condition that 
they showed loyalty (sadakat) to the Sultan and performed the duties normally 
assigned to timar holders. 19 There were even cases, in which a timar fief previously 
held by a Muslim could be transferred to a Christian sipahi. 20 In the course of the 
gradual transformation of the Balkan Ottoman lands from frontier areas into core 
regions of the empire, these Christian sipahis gradually adopted Islam. It should be 
noted, however, that no signs allude to the implementation of any forms of outright 
Islamisation policies on behalf of the Ottoman state21 • While Prof. Inalcik had 
concerned himself mainly with the Serbian, Macedonian, western Bulgarian and 
Greek lands, S. Dzaja has outlined similar processes in respect to 15-16 c. Bosnia 
whereby the conversion of local nobility to Islam progressed at a considerably quicker 
pace.22 
From the late sixteenth century onwards the established system of checks and 
balances started to disintegrate and the old equilibrium was already showing signs of 
breaking down. Briefly put, Ottoman society during the 17-1 Sth centuries was in a 
state of flux in a sharp contrast to the previous state of equilibrium. The power of the 
sultan had become significantly weakened, and imperial authority started to be 
increasingly delegated to royal vukela (deputies) and nudema (companions) from the 
court. At the same time, the previously neatly outlined boundaries among the various 
19 Inalcik, Halil, "Stefan Dusan'dan Osmanli lmparatorluguna: XV. Asirda Rumeli'de Hiristiyan 
Sipahiler ve Men§eleri", in Osmanli lmparatorlugu:Toplum ve Ekonomi, Istanbul: Eren, 1993, p.93 
20 Ibidem, p.92. 
21 Ibidem, pp.93-94. 
22 Dzaja, S. M. Konfesionalitat und Nationalitat Bosniens und der Herzegovina, Miinchen: R. 
Oldenbourg, 1984, pp. 30-40. 
12 
social orders, and generally, between the reaya and askeri became progressively 
blurred. In fact infringement of the reaya upon the domain of the askeri was normally 
seen by Ottoman observers of decline, such as Ko~i bey, as a major reason for the 
increasing social, political, and economic "chaos".23 All this was accompanied by all-
important changes in taxation and increasing decentralisation of Ottoman 
administration. "The abandonment of Uva kanunnameleri and the growing pace of 
tax experimentation should be taken as symptoms of whatever form early modern 
centralisation had taken in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ... it should therefore 
also suggest a diminution of the coercive powers of the ruling class in Istanbul". 24 All 
these consequently to an increasingly uncontrolled abuses and tax extortion that 
gravely affected the reaya, which, in its turn, reacted in the form of social unrest and 
migrations. 
Ottoman scholars have listed numerous reasons for these profound changes 
that befell the empire, we deem relevant to outline just the most important of them. 
Indisputably, external factors, like the growing superiority of Western powers, the 
spread of firearms into the Ottoman countryside, as well as the general halt of 
Ottoman territorial expansion, the influx of imported silver and aggressive trading 
policies on the part of Western states were among the most important factors that 
conditioned transformation of Ottoman state and society. To these, the population 
pressure factor is generally added as one of vital significance. One should not 
underestimate the indigenous roots for internal change in Ottoman society for most of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries25 and the break down of consensus within 
Ottoman ruling elites together with the corresponding intra-elite struggles. 
23 Inalcik, "Military and Fisca1 ... ", pp.283-4. 
24 El-Hadj, "The Formation ... ", pp. 13-14. 
25 Ibidem, p.12. 
13 
The emerging military superiority of the West and the subsequent halt of the 
territorial expansion of the Ottoman state posed quandaries to the central authorities in 
Istanbul, which led to internal complications induced the Ottoman state to embark 
upon fundamental changes in respect to its military organization and fiscal regime. 
As early as during the war of 1593 - 1606 "reports sent by Ottoman commanders 
from the battlefront to the government indicated that the Ottoman forces, and 
especially the sipahi cavalry armed with the conventional weapons of bow and arrow, 
lance, sword, and shield, proved ineffectual against the Austrian musketeers". 26 This 
appeared one reason for the Ottoman government to resort to a steady increase in the 
numbers of the standing infantry corps: from 13,000 in the 1550s to 38,000 in the 
1600s. 27 This, in turn, led to the introduction of policies that led to the gradual 
phasing out of the sipahi order. In its scramble for revenues, and being increasingly 
unable to take care of surplus extraction on its own, the government was forced to 
transform more and more of the of the timar fiefs into mukataas (tax farms) which 
was aimed at supplying the central government with fresh money supply to meet its 
increasing demands. Significant portions of imperial revenue were farmed out to 
finance specific Janissary garrisons. 28 
On the other hand, the central government started relying upon provincial 
governors to participate in campaigns with their own privately recruited armies from 
the increasing number of landless peasants (levents), the latter being financed through 
the collection of extraordinary levies (avariz-i divaniyye) as well as unlawful 
extortions (tekalif-i ~akka, salgun, salma). These soldiers, known as sekban and 
sarzca, added to the turmoil in the provinces as they were usually dismissed after the 
end of each military campaign, and being armed with handguns, whose proliferation 
26 Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal ... ", p.288. 
27 Ibidem, p.289. 
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in the provinces the central government was in no position to control, engaged in 
repeated raids that gravely affected the local reaya population. Given the growing 
settlement of Janissaries in the provincial centers, where they increasingly got 
involved in economic activities, entering the city guilds and engaging in tax-farming, 
the sekban and sarzca soon came to grips with the Janissaries themselves. Many of 
the former would often require to be appointed to the Janissary corps after the and of a 
campaign, and in case of a refusal to be awarded such concession could become the 
reason for serious disturbances, the most well known of which - that led by Y egen 
Osman Pasha, who was consecutively appointed to the posts of Sancak beyi and 
Berlerbeyi (of Rumelia) by Mehmed IV (1648 - 1687) and Suleyman II, respectively. 
The latter resorted to such a measure as he saw in Y egen Osman and his sekban army 
the only group powerful enough to stand up against the Janissaries, who had deposed 
Mehmed IV29• 
These trends were parallelled by increasing decentralisation of the provincial 
administration. Starting from the beginning of the seventeenth century, the central 
government began to limit the terms of appointment of local governors with the 
obvious aim to curb their powers. Sancak beyis, in their turn, increasingly delegated 
their authority to deputies (mutesellims), who came from the ranks of the local 
notables (ayans). The ayan-miitesellims gradually became more powerful than the 
local governors themselves. Possessing a solid local power base, ayans were also 
appointed to administer mukataas or malikanes (lifelong leases, introduced in 1695) 
which were usually given to palace favourites. 30 It is important to note here that by 
the end of the seventeenth century, it had become a wide spread practice to re-lease 
28 Radushev, Agrarnite institutsii, pp. 67-68. 
29 Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal ... ", pp.299-300. 
30 Inalcik, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration", Thomas Naff and Roger 
Owen, eds. Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, Carbondale, 1977, pp. 29-31. 
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mukataas and malikanes, which, given that each consecutive claimant aimed at 
maximizing his won profit, finally led to increasing extortion of taxes from the reaya. 
Even remaining small timar holders found it practical to lease their timar fief, thus, 
unlawfully turning them into small mukataas. 
In the Balkans, this situation of turmoil and instability was further exacerbated 
by the fact that the region stood on the way to or was part of the battlefield itself in a 
number of long and heavy-loss incurring wars with European powers. By that time, 
the Ottoman Balkans had turned from a frontier zone into a core region of the Empire, 
with all the initial privileges that were bestowed to Christian elites or reaya (e.g. 
Christian sipahi or Christian muaf ve musellem) essentially eliminated. 
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Chapter 2. Sources 
Indisputably, in order to understand, and explain more satisfactorily Balkan 
Islamisation with all its complexity and regional specifics, one is to objectively 
explore all available archival documents which shed more light one way or another on 
the nature and major characteristics of this process. The present chapter will make an 
attempt to present and briefly discuss the various primary sources on which this study 
is based. The major primary source utilized hereafter is a group of single Ottoman 
documents (arzuhals) from the mid-lih. to the mid-181h c. preserved at the Oriental 
Department of the National Library St. Cyril and Methodius in Sofia, Bulgaria. 
In essence, these documents are expositions of the adoption of Islam on behalf 
of new converts. In them, together with their formal declaration of having adopted 
Islam or of being ready to adopt Islam, and a petition for receiving the relevant sums 
of money for new clothes in accordance with "the custom" or with "the law", the 
modern student of history will find much more specific demands related to the 
solution of some purely personal problem or to the rewarding of certain social 
privilege (e.g. an appointment to a specific administrative position). Thus, these 
documents allow for a better exploration of the mechanisms of the Islamisation 
process and the factors that conditioned it. They depict in greater detail the state of 
mind of the new converts, their personal motivation, in the context of the changing 
political and socio-economic situation in the Ottoman Empire during 17th_1g1h 
centuries. 
The earliest arzuhals of this type preserved at the National Library archives in 
Sofia date from 1088AH I 1677 AD, which is by no means a guarantee that the 
practice of drawing up such documents started that late. Even the earliest examples 
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preserved in Sofia show a high degree of stereotipity, which itself needed a 
considerable period of time to be achieved. The arzuhals are normally quite short and 
contain several important elements: an address to the supreme authority in the empire 
(the Sultan), a declaration stating that the petitioner is a new Muslim, and a petition 
for being awarded money for new clothes and/or some other privilege. 
The form of these documents, as well as the way they were processed shows 
that these arzuhals were drawn up in the imperial chancery (divan) on behalf of 
people who came from all parts of the empire (but mainly from the Balkans) to accept 
Islam in the presence of the Sultan, the Grand Vizier, or other high imperial officials, 
including the Aga of the Janissaries or the head of the bostanci corps, the kaymakam 
pasha, etc. Of course, this does not mean that all the arzuhals were written just in 
Istanbul, for, as it is well known, the chancery normally accompanied the sultan (and 
the grand vizier) in all their campaigns and travels (including hunting expeditions). 
For some of the arzuhals it is quite clear that they were written in Edirne which 
Sultans, especially some like Mehmed IV (1648 - 1687), visited quite often. 
The practice of drawing up and processing kisve bahasz arzuhals however, 
was not a monopoly of the imperial chancery. Quite understandably, in 
geographically isolated territories, such as the island of Crete, petitions were 
processed locally, bore the resolution of the vali of Crete, the relevant sums were 
allotted from the local treasury. 31 
However, recently, we came upon an interesting document - a huccet of the 
kadz of Sofia, dated July, 1709AD, which entitled a certain Osman <;elebi, an 
inhabitant of Sofia, to take 1 para (3 ak~e) alloted as a daily allowance for "living 
and the value of clothes" to a certain nine-year old Ay~e, upon her conversion to 
31 NBKM, I, 10923,, ll 12 AH/1700 AD, f.1-2; NBKM, 1, 10926, I 112AH/1700AD, f. 1-4 
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Islam. 32 This document reveals that it was possible to attain certain social and 
financial privileges upon conversion at the local level, and thus presents the 
researcher with a puzzle - according to the information given in a petition from less 
than a quarter of a century earlier, a man from "the villages of Bosnia" had come to 
the capital in person to convert in the presence of the Sultan, thus rendering the 
possible suggestion that Sofia was at too great a distance from Istanbul to allow for 
such a trip untenable. 33 Also, certain petitions suggest that it was possible for one to 
go to the capital and submit a petition on behalf of somebody else, thus dismissing, in 
its turn the argument claiming that a new convert had to necessarily go to Istanbul in 
person. As the case is the only one of its sort, that we have found, it poses a number 
of questions, which obviously suggest the need for further research. 
Let us return to the petitions, which are the focus of this study. In their 
functional essence these arzuhals (written in ta' lik or divani and from 1734 onwards 
mainly in rik'a) represent also the beginning of a financial correspondence, which had 
to direct and justify the allotment of specific sums of money from the imperial 
treasury. In them, besides the main text, there are to be found additional entries 
(derkenars - written usually in nesih or siyakat) which allow us to follow the "route" 
of each document through the various imperial offices, i.e., the way the arzuhals were 
processed. As the main part of the arzuhals (i.e. the petition itself) was by rule 
undated, it is exactly from these additional entries that we get information about the 
exact date the petitions entered the administrative process, and how quickly they were 
taken care of (for as these petitions "traveled" from office to office, each of the latter 
recorded its own date of handling the document). 
32 Moreover, the document has been published in P. Petrov, Po Sledite 1U1 Nasilieto, Sofia, 1987, p. 
289, and is originally to be found in a sicil defteri preserved in Sofia -NBKM, S. 4, f. 49-1, but 
strangely enough has escaped the attention of Bulgarian Ottomanists. 
33 NBKM, OAK, 76/52, l097AH/1686AD 
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In the case of simple petitions (those just presenting a declaration of adoption 
the faith and demanding the allotment of the appropriate sum for new clothes) usually 
only three additional entries are to be observed: a dated resolution of the grand vizier 
attesting that the petitioner has already become a Muslim and that he/she should be 
awarded money in accordance with the "custom" or the "law", normally followed by 
an undated resolution of the ba§defterdar (the chief financial officer of the empire) 
that authorized the issuance of a tezkire (tezkire virile), and a dated entry of the 
ba§muhasebe (the chief accounting office of the empire), attesting that such a 
document has been issued (tezkire dade, tezkire virildi). A quick glance at these 
additional entries shows that the documents in question were normally processed 
within 1 to 10 days. 
In a great portion of the documents in question, however, the petitioners 
present their specific situation, sometimes whole life stories, in which they demand 
the solution of a specific problem: such is the case of a sailor unjustly accused of 
murder, who pleaded to be forgiven and released from the galley he was sent to work 
on because "even if I had been guilty, now I have changed" (i.e. accepted Islam)34 -
in such cases we find a number of additional entries which attest that thorough 
investigations have been made to prove the correctness of the information given in the 
arzuhal - recurrent resolutions of the grand vizier, telhises (summaries of the case) 
written to the Sultan, requests on behalf of the ba§defterdar to the ba§muhasebe for 
more information, extracts from the registers of the ba§muhasebe (or other offices), 
further notifications, etc. 
In many other cases, we find a request (from the grand vizier or the 
ba§defterdar to the ba§muhasebe) for an updated recalculation of the sum that was to 
34 NBKM, NPTA XX 1/28, f. 51(l135AH/1723AD). This case will be discussed in further detail later 
in this study. 
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be given for new clothes, which gives us valuable information about changes m the 
amount of sums normally awarded, as well as about the inflationary processes in the 
empire over the period the arzuhals refer to. A fine example in this respect provides 
the petition of a Christian priest who converted to Islam, where one can find 
additional entries (excerpts from the registers of the bash-muhasebe) showing the 
respective value of a full set of clothes for 1129AH/1716-1717AD, 1132AH/ 1719-
1720AD, and 1133AH/1720-1721AD- 16, 25, and 64 guru~ respectively. 35 
Besides, the additional entries on these arzuhals give us more information on 
the differentiation the Ottoman authorities made in the treatment of different converts 
in accordance with their social status - thus more money were allotted to converts 
who had higher social status prior to their conversion, and some who were of special 
importance to the Porte, such as Count De Bonneval (who participated actively in the 
reorganization of the Ottoman artillery corps between 1729 and 1747) were given 
extraordinary treatment. 36 
Let's return now to the main part of the arzuhals - the contents of the 
converts' petitions. Essentially, these present us with details about the personal 
motives of the new converts. As just a few hundred (up to a thousand) arzuhals of 
this type have been preserved in the Oriental Department of the National Library in 
Sofia, and other archival collections have not been researched well in this respect up 
to now, one can hardly use these documents for an analysis of the quantitative 
parameters of the Islamisation in the Ottoman Empire. The petitions, however, shed 
more light on the specific factors that influenced the personal drive for becoming a 
Muslim, such as fiscal pressure and financial difficulties, the quest for social 
advancement, etc. The contents of the arzuhals also poses some other questions such 
35 NBKM, lA, 6808, f. I. 
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as whether the process was forced or voluntary, what was the role syncretic Islam (the 
role of tarikats) and cryptochristianity in predisposing people to convert, whether 
higher classes were more prone to convert than lower ones or vice versa. 
As the above discussed petitions, which have been taken as a point of 
departure in the present study, provide information that is still fairly limited in scope 
due to their functional nature, the necessity to consult other primary sources in an 
attempt to cast more light on such issues appears obvious. Various supplementary 
sources could be utilised in relation to this. 
Among them, sicil defterleri (kad1 court registers) are generally considered by 
modern scholarship as a source that could provide bountiful information on socio-
economic life at the communal level. Ottoman court registers contained not only 
cases of litigation, but also included financial and property transactions, imperial 
decrees (jirmans) regarding the kad1 's proper performance of his duties, judicial 
malpractices, as well as "tax collection (especially the poll tax, or cizye, levied on 
non-Muslim subjects of the Empire), redress of grievances, suppression of banditry, 
and other matters of administration". 37 
It is important to note that zimmi, men and women alike38, founded it normal 
to resort to the kad1 court to seek solutions to legal problems among themselves as 
well as among themselves and members of the local Muslim community and the 
representatives of the local authorities. Thus kad1 court records present the researcher 
with opportunities to concentrate on various aspects of the daily socio-economic life 
36 Count De Bonneval' s (Ahmed Bey) case will be discussed in further detail later in this thesis. See 
pp. 44-45. 
37 Jennings, R., "Limitations of the Judicial Powers of the Kadi in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri", Studia 
Islamica, number XLVIIl, 1978, pp. 151-154. 
38 Jennigs, R, "Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records - the Shari'a Court of 
Anatolian Kayseri", in Journal of the economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. XVIII, Part I, 
p.110., "Zimmis (Non-Muslims) in Early 17th Century Ottoman Records", in Journal of the economic 
and Social History of the Orient, Vol. XX/, Part Ill, pp/ 250-251. 
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of specific groups in the empire, such as zimmis or women, as well as to clarify their 
social and political position. 
Due to certain limitations stemming from the format and focus of this study, 
kad1 court registers will be used to procure appropriate evidence in respect to only two 
important aspects of socio-economic life in the Ottoman Balkans. Firstly, as sicil 
defterleri contain registrations of property transactions, they provide important 
information in regard to prices of certain goods and estate property (houses, shops, 
land, etc.), and the latter could be juxtaposed to the financial advantages related to 
conversion, such as the value of clothes a new convert was rewarded as well as the 
rate of the ci:zye, from which he/she was made exempt upon conversion to give a 
relative measure of the extent of financial pressure as a factor that possibly 
contributed to one's making a decision to convert. 
In addition, information derived from sicils might give an idea of the degree of 
intermingling and interaction between members of Muslim and zimmi communities in 
the Balkan city. Estate property as well as financial transactions, as registered in kad1 
court records, normally render the names, professions and/or social status (e.g. 
Janissary) of the signatories of a contract. Besides, in the case of sale, purchase, and 
lease of estate property, the boundaries of the estate are normally duly delineated, thus 
giving a the names of the owners of the surrounding estates. As these names are 
subjected to a routine antroponymical analysis, the researcher is in a position to 
acquire a better notion of the social, ethnic, and religious composition of a city or a 
particular quarter (mahalle) as well as the level of social and cultural integration 
among people belonging to different religious communities and possessing different 
social status, i.e. to what extent it was normal Muslims to sell and buy property from 
zimmis, or was it normal for zimmis and Muslims, or new converts (usually designated 
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as "son of Abdullah") to live as neighbours. Such questions appear of marked 
significance in respect to establishing the existence or lack of relative fluidity and 
flexibility in Muslim-zimmi communal life (especially in the cities), which in its turn, 
could be a factor predisposing or discouraging, respectively, a non-Muslim to convert. 
The sicil defterleri to be utilised in this study are mainly from Sofia, Vidin and Russe, 
covering the period to which the arzuhals for conversion to Islam refer to.39 
Fetvas will be utilised to cast more light upon Muslim-zimmi relations as well 
as to examine certain legal of conversion and apostacy. Although fetvas are non 
binding advisory opinions to an individual questioner (mustafti), they have a 
particular appeal to the researcher with their "eternal validity" (they could be applied 
to any case, given that the circumstances described in the question correspond to those 
of that real case).40 Most Ottoman fetvas have been preserved in "secondary fetva 
collections", i.e. ones, in which "the question and answer have undergone systematic 
alterations"41 , many highly specific details are omitted, and instead of the names of 
real persons, "a set of conventional names, usually Zeyd, Amr, Bekr and Bishr for 
males, and Hind, Zeyneb and Khadija for females" are used.42 Another characteristic 
feature of Ottoman fetvas, is that especially after Ebu's-su'ud, who served as a 
~eyhii'l-islam from 1545 to 1574, the procedures for issuing fetvas became highly 
bureucratised, the question itself was drafted by a trained jurist in the office of the 
39 Todorov, Nikolai, and Maria Kalitsin, eds., Fontes Turcici Historiae Bulgaricae, Vol. 6 
(21), Sofia, 1977, Cvetkova, Bistra, ed., Fontes Turcici Historiae iuris Bulgarici, Vol. 2, Sofia, 1971 
40 Masud, M., B. Messick, and D. Powers, 'Muftis Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation', in Muftis 
and Their Fatwas., Masud, Messick, Powers, eds., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, 
pp. 3, 19. 
41 Hallaq, W.H., 'From Fatwas to Furu': Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law', Islamic Law 
and Society l, February, 1994, p. 44. 
42 Imber, C., Ebu's-su'ud and Islamic ugal Tradition, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 
56. 
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fetvahane, the final draft being confirmed by the fetva emini, and thus a simplified 
(positive or negative) answer on behalf of the ~eyhii 'I-is/am was presupposed.43 
Nonetheless, as, due to their functional nature, it has generally been accepted 
by modern scholarship that they refer to real life situations, Ottoman do provide 
important information with regard to Ottoman socio-economic and religious history, 
as well as to the way specific issues were viewed and dealt with within the context of 
Islamic legal (Hanefi) tradition.44 Two collections of fetvas of Ottoman ~eyhiil-
is/ams, ali <;atalcah Efendi and Abdurrahim Efendi, will be utilized in the present 
study. As these works are typical secondary fetva collections, on may safely assume, 
that the fetvas contained therein, as they had attracted the attention of the compiler, 
relate to more or less typical real life problems, which in its turn could provide helpful 
to clarifying the nature of issues like Muslim-zimmi relations, as well as conversion 
and apostacy. 
Apart from Ottoman administrative and legal documents, the use of non-
Ottoman sources, such as travel accounts of western and East European observers, 
appear of special relevance to the study of zimmi-Muslim relations and Islamisation in 
the Ottoman Balkans. As, due to political, economic, and religious reasons, this 
region has naturally attracted the attention of European political and intellectual 
circles, life in "European Turkey" became the focus of interest of a steady flow of 
Europeans who passed through the region most often as members of diplomatic 
missions. Given the social and political status, the solid educational (and linguistic) 
background, as well as their prior know ledge of Ottoman affairs, present us with well 
informed description and assessment of daily life in the Ottoman Balkan provinces, 
often with a deliberate accent on the life of Balkan (Orthodox) Christians. When 
43 Heyd, U., 'Some Aspects of the Ottoman Fetva'', BSOAS 32, pp. 39-41, 49. 
44 Hallaq, op.cit. pp. 32-37. 
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utilizing such sources, however, one should be aware of the personal inclinations and 
biases of these observers, especially in respect to their religious affiliation, their 
political and professional status, hence the nature of their mission, as well as the 
current state of relation between the Porte and the respective countries they came 
from. In addition to this Paul Rycaut's general descriptions of the Ottoman empire 
and "the Greek Church" also prove to be of use. 
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Chapter 3. Patterns of Motivation for Conversion. Factors Conditioning 
Conversion 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter is going to deal with the possible factors that affected a zimmi 's 
decision in the Ottoman Balkans to convert during the period in question in the light 
of the information the researcher is able to extract from the herein discussed petitions. 
These factors could be grouped in three main categories: fiscal pressure, the quest for 
social advancement, and religious influences, namely, the state of the local Balkan 
churches, and the role of heterodox religious orders and cryptochristianity in 
predisposing a non-Muslim to convert. 
The evidence that could be derived from the petitions directly points to the 
existence and influence the first two factors had in conditioning the set of mind of a 
new convert. One is not to forget that the petitioners had to go to Istanbul in most of 
the cases (which normally entailed considerable material sacrifices), and that in their 
functional essence the petitions were meant to finally lead to the convert's being 
awarded clothes and/or money. In a significant number of arzuhals (as will be shown 
later) petitioners also asked to be appointed to an administrative position. The fact 
that converts could ceremonially accept Islam in the presence of high ranking 
Ottoman officials (and even the Sultan, in certain cases) also alludes to the possibility 
that at least some of the new converts (given the typical mind frame of lower class 
people in the empire) may have considered this as an additional chance to be granted 
specific material or social advantage. 
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Besides, the above mentioned religious influences should also to be born in 
mind, as they, although the discussed documents do not provide any cues in this 
respect, played an important role in predisposing a potential convert to make certain 
"compromises" related to the changing of one's faith. One should not underestimate, 
of course, the existence of cases of genuine spiritual transformation. Given the role of 
Islamic syncretism embodied by dervish orders, which successfully incorporated 
many elements of Christianity and Judaism into their heterodox doctrines, such cases 
may have been (and quite probably have been) numerous, but it is virtually impossible 
to prove anything on the basis of the text of the arzuhals which are the focus of this 
paper. 
A great portion of the documents that are discussed in this paper contain just a 
simple declaration of adopting the faith (accompanied with standard expressions like 
" I saw light", "I reached the divine truth'', etc.), together with a demand to receive 
money for clothes45 . It is precarious to speculate about the motives of these converts. 
As many other arzuhals list quite explicitly specific factors for conversion, these 
converts who presented just a "plain" petition, probably were not pressed by 
something specific, but just hoped to raise their social status one step up by 
transforming themselves from Christian or Jewish reaya into Muslim reaya. As 
Selim Deringil put it: "the small insults of everyday life, like being called "mi.irted" 
rather than "rahmetli" when you die, not being allowed to wear certain colors or 
45 Numerous examples of this kind may be given: to list just but a few NBKM, l, 10787, f. 1-2 
(1088AH/1677AD); NBKM, 1, 10486, f.l (1093AH/1682AD); NBKM, NPTA, XX, 1/28, f.42 
(1128AH/1716AD); NBKM, I, 11060, f. 1 (1136AH/1724AD); NBKM, OAK 50/94 f.l 
(1263AH/1847AD). 
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clothes, not being allowed to ride certain animals, the little barbs endured on a daily 
basis, these must have been the basic reason for many a conversion". 46 
1.2. Fiscal Pressure 
Of special interest are the petitions in which heavy material or financial 
problems were explicitly given as a motive that influenced a new convert to adopt 
Islam. There abound arzuhals in which petitioners state: "let the merciful Padishah 
allot me some money for living and small expenses"47 , "I do not have family and 
relatives, and come from far away, my legs are crippled"48, "we are two infirm boys 
... give us a full set of clothes and add something (some money) for food"49 . A 
mother of two children stated: "I am a lonely poor woman, do not have relatives or a 
place to live ... point to me a place to live".50 
There exist arzuhals in which the new converts present the reasons for their 
difficult financial situation in great detail. Such is the case of an Armenian woman 
from Istanbul who explained at length how she rebuilt the house left by her late 
husband, incurred a debt of 200 guru§, rented the house to a vakf for 1,5 akire daily, 
but later her son sued her over the property rights of the house, and as he was about to 
win the case, she became Muslim and pleaded to the Sultan to solve her problem. 51 In 
a similar case a Greek woman abandoned by her husband who also left her with a debt 
of 30 guru§ had a dream which said: "Accept Islam, ... then the Sultan will take care 
of you".52 
46 Deringil, Selim, "On Conversion and Apostacy in the Late Ottoman Empire", a paper presented at an 
Workshop on New Approaches to the Study of Ottoman and Arab Societies ( 18'h to mid-20'h centuries) 
at Bogazi9i University, istanbul, May 27-30, 1999. 
47 NBKM, I, 11051, f. l (l 134AH, 1722AD). 
48 NBKM, IA, 57265, f.l (l 132AH/1720AD). 
49 NBKM, 1, 11056, f. l (l 135AH/I 723AD). 
50 NBKM, 1, 11058, f. l ( l 136AH/I 723AD). 
51 NBKM, NPT A, XX 1128, 50 (l 134AH/1722AD). 
52 NBKM, I, I I 106, f.I (1144AH/1731AD). 
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There are still other cases in which the heavy financial problems of new 
converts were immediately taken care of according to the additional entries into their 
arzuhals. A father with seven children who collectively converted received a daily 
stipend of 14 ak're from the revenue of Erzurum customs house. 53 
It is important to note that in most of these cases, the converts were given 
nothing more than the relevant sum for clothes (at least this is what the resolutions on 
the documents show). As it will be shown below, however, this sum itself was often 
quite high to allow for the social pre-categorization of the convert. Besides this, new 
converts were promptly taken out of the cizye registers (as well as from other registers 
concerning the collection of various taxes paid by non-Muslims).54 
Here arises another important question - did new converts receive actual 
clothes or their monetary value. Given the very high amount of money at which "new 
Muslim clothes" were estimated that the petitioners would undertake a long journey to 
the capital if they were to be awarded just clothes (moreover, quite a high number of 
petitions were drawn up during winter time). In a derkenar of the b~muhasebe, to be 
found in a petition dated 1122AH/1710AD55, it is asserted that in order to preclude 
misuses at the expense of new converts, they should be given the monetary value 
instead of actual clothes. In a later petition, dated 1144AH/1731 AD56 a new convert 
asks to be rewarded a full set of clothes or at least half of its value, which clearly 
53 NBKM, lA, 6783, f. 1. (1089AH/1678AD). 
54 Of special interest here is the conversion from paying ispenre to paying rift-resmi. A partcularly 
important difference in the rates of the two taxes relates to the specific rates for unmarried men 
(miicerreds). While unmarried Muslims had to pay 12 ak~e (classical age rate), compared to 24 for 
married Muslims, the rate of ispenre was unchangeably set at 25 ak~e for all adult males. Thus, it is far 
from surprising that the sizable difference between the rates of rift-resmi and ispenfe for single adult 
men may well have exerted pressure upon Christian miicerreds to convert. Thus, a number of Ottoman 
fiscal registers pertaining to the Balkan lands show that in many cases, the Muslim single men 
category is represented predominantly by new converts. A fine example in this respect is the mufassal 
defteri for kaza Nevrekob (modem Southwestern Bulgaria) of 1723, in which one may find whole 
villages in which all unmarried Muslims are "sons of Abdullah" (the information concerning this 
specific register (BOA, Mevkufat Kalemi, 2873) was kindly provided to me by Dr. E. Radushev). 
5 NBKM, SI 6, 18, f.3 
56 NBKM, lA, 57319, f.9 
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suggests that he expected to receive a specific sum of money. A number of 
documents contain an additional notification on their verso, attesting that the reward 
was given to a person who acted as an intermediary ("given to Mehmed Cavu~, Halil 
<;avu~, etc.), it is logical to think that such people expected a certain sum of money 
from the beneficiary as a commission, which suggests, in turn, that money, but not 
clothes was most probably handed out. Two documents of this type date from as 
early as 1 lOOAH/1689 and l lOlAH/1689 respectively. 57 Such documents also 
suggest the possibility that some converts may not have traveled to Istanbul, but could 
have used Ottoman officials, whose functions entailed traveling through the Balkans, 
as intermediaries to take care of such petitions. Given the lack of evidence that 
directly points to such a possibility, the latter remains as a mere logical supposition, 
that still deserves attention. 
A. Zheliazkova has also generally proposed that, at least in some cases, and 
even during the 1 ?1h c. the additional entries in the petitions suggested that money was 
given for buying clothes (the amount of money was thus calculated item by item in a 
separate entry). Given that the petitions show that even when new converts accepted 
Islam in the presence of a high Ottoman official, they did no get clothes at that point 
of time, but had to petition afterwards, probably clothes were not given as such at a 
specific ceremony, but converts were simply handed out the money to buy clothes 
themselves. It is another question whether there was any control over what the 
converts would do with the allotted sum, it is also likely that, in accordance with the 
Islamic tradition, kisve bahas1 (value of clothes) was simply the symbolic name under 
which financial grants were awarded upon conversion, as clothes and the change of 
57 NBKM, I, 10866; NBKM, 1, 57319 
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clothes were related in an important way to one's social status and identity in the 
Ottoman empire. 58 
It is appealing to speculate that such conversions came directly as a result of 
the increased fiscal burden that non-Muslim faced during the 17th_1gth centuries. 
During this period the rates of cizye and ispen~e, paid exclusively by non-Muslims, as 
well as reaya taxes in general (such as avariz and niizUl) increased manifold and 
abuses related to their collection become widespread. We deem it relevant to briefly 
discuss the nature and rates of these taxes and compare them to the prices of certain 
goods, especially estate property (according to the information provided in sicil 
defterleri), as well as to the value of clothes a petitioner was granted. This could help 
to better understand the actual parameters of financial alleviation that the petitioners 
achieved upon conversion. 
The cizye was introduced by the Ottomans upon conquest of the different parts 
of the Balkan peninsula during the late 14th and the first three quarters of the 15th 
centuries. Sanctioned by nass and ictihad as asserted in firmans (imperial decrees) 
cizye was for the Ottomans a religious poll-tax the collection and spending of which 
received special care and which was collected as a rule directly for the state treasury 
by the Sultan's own kuls.59 Cizye was levied upon adult males. Children, women, 
poor people (especially those living on alms), crippled, blind and old men (normally 
above 15 years of age), clerics were exempted.60 To these one should add certain 
reaya groups with special obligations (akmczs, voynuks, etc.) which were normally 
exempted during the classical age, but later gradually became liable to paying the poll 
tax.61 Before 1691, when the central government embarked upon a large-scale tax 
58 Zheliazkova, op.cit., p. 185, also personal communication with A. Zheliazkova, November, 1999. 
59 Inalcik, H., "Djizya", EI 2, 11, p. 562. 
60 Hadzibegic, H., Glavarina u Osmanskoj Drzavi, Sarajevo, 1966, pp. 13-17. 
61 Ibid. pp. 24. 
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reform, the poll tax was normally levied per household at rates specific for the 
different administrative - territorial units of the empire. The rate of cizye increased 
steadily during the 17th c., due to both the debasement of the Ottoman ak\:e and the 
increased military expenditure of the empire. In 1604, together with the 30 ak~e 
added as an equivalent of the abolished sheep tax (resm-i agnam), 5 ak~e resm-i ciilus 
and 10 ak~e gulamiye, the rate of cizye was 200 ak~e. In 1622 this sum went up to 
222 ak~e, and in 1633 to 232 ak~e.62 Between 1651 and 1687, the total rate of cizye 
(which included 40 ak~e muba§ir akr;esi) was between 310 and 385 ak~e for different 
districts in the Ottoman Balkans. 63 
It should be born in mind, however, that there existed numerous cases of abuse 
related to the collection of cizye. In 1634 there were cases in which tax collectors 
extorted more then 400 ak~e (i.e. up to twice as much as the official rate), and in mid 
century cases of collection of the cizye for the following year were recorded.64 It 
should be admitted, though, that through energetic measures, abuses were curbed to 
an extent during the time the grand vizier Kopriilil Mehmed pa~a (1656-1661), and his 
nephew Fazil Ahmed pa~a (1661-1676).65 
Amidst a long and heavy loss incurring war with the Holy League, a new 
system of collecting the cizye that replaced household collection with a new method 
based on individual tax-cards was introduced in 1691, allegedly to conform with the 
prescriptions of the Haneft school of Islamic law. 66 In accordance with the latter 
taxpayers were divided into three categories - ala, evsat, and, adna (higher, middle, 
62 Grozdanova, E., "Sabiraneto na danaka cizye v Balgarskite zemi prez XVII I XVIII vek", 
Istoricheski Pregled, 1970, No. 5, p. 83 
63 Ibid., p. 84. 
64 Hadzibegic, op. cit. p. 68 
65 Ibid., p. 69. 
66Ibid., p. 86 
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and lower), usually in proportion 2:6:2, or 1:8:167 , but sometimes in another one (e.g. 
1:7:2)68 , and had to pay cizye in the amount of 4, 2, and 1 §eri.fi dukats, respectively 
Thus, the most numerous category of tax payers was to pay 4.5 esedi guru§ (540 ak:~e) 
in 1691. Given that prior to the reform, a hane, which contained on average two cizye 
taxpayers, had to pay up to 450 ak:ce, and the relative stabilization of prices, the 
increase of the cizye rate in real terms is out of doubt.69 This in combination with the 
increasing decentralization and the growing role of iltizam (especially the farming out 
of tax collection to individuals) further increased the fiscal burden of the (non-
Muslim) re'aya - malpractices in regard to the colleciton of the poll-tax (as well as 
other taxes), such as the taxation of children, infirm and adults, trying to "sell" more 
tax cards than appropriate, double taxation, etc., which in the past had been 
considered an exception, became commonplace.70 The collectors of cizye were 
particularly prone to misuse and corruption in remote mountainous areas where 
central state control was weak:. 71 "A particularly onerous condition for the Christian 
peasantry in the Balkans came about from the Ottoman practice of imposing 
collective responsibility on village communities for poll-tax on fugitives and the 
dead".72 A Matkovski has provided us with an example in this respect, showing that 
the Christian community in a specific village (in Macedonia) had to pay 4200 ak:~e 
(gerihte) for 5 people who had fled without having paid their cizye in 1714. 73 
It is hard to say what exactly was the extent of the financial burden, the levy of 
cizye brought about. Still, the fact that both prior and after the tax reform of 1691, tax 
67 Ibid., p. 101. 
68 Nedkoff, B. Die Cizya (Kopfsteuer) im Osmanischen Reich. Mit Besondere Beriicksichtigung von 
Bulgarien, Leipzig, 1942, p.24. 
69 Grozdanova, op. cit., p. 83. 
70 Grozdanova, E., "Sabiraneto na danaka jizye v Balgarskite zemi prez XVII i XVIII v.", Istoricheski 
Pregled, 1970, No. 5, pp. 78, 90. 
71 Nedkoff, B., op.cit. p. 25. 
72 lnalcik, H., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, with D. Quataert, 
eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 69. 
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payers, especially in the rural areas protested against the increased fiscal burden in the 
form of revolts and migrations, is a clear indication that, at least in a number of cases, 
the levies had become unbearable. 74 
The rates for ci:zye for the middle category of ci:zye payers (avsat), was 4.5, 5, 
and 5.5 esedi guru§ in 1691, 1696, and 1744, respectively,75 and if we go back to rates 
immediately before 1691, we will find their values in the amount of 300 - 400 akye. 
At the same time, the value of a full/ ordinary set of clothes in the period 1670 -1691 
was around 5000/1000 akye respectively, and after 1691 it was 50110 guru§. 
According to a specific document a full set of clothes (miikemmel kisve bahas1) was 
valued at 5080 akye in 1685 (an ordmary set cost approximately five times as little). 76 
A comparison between the respective rates of ci:zye and the values of an ordinary set 
of clothes would clearly show that, beside being exempted from paying the poll tax, 
new converts were rewarded a sum of money exceeding the rate of ci:zye two to three 
times. 
In this line of thoughts, it will be of use just to mention the considerable 
increase of another group of taxes, namely avariz and nuzUl, during the 1670-1750 
period. In the context of endless wars that the empire was engaged in, these two taxes 
were already annualized and monetarized at rates which were ten to fifteen times as 
high as the mid-sixteenth century rates - "whereas in the mid-sixteenth century 
typical avariz rates were 30 or 40 akye per year (as were nuzul rates when monetized), 
73 Matkovski, A., Kreposnishtvoto vo Makedonija, Skopje, I 978, p. I I I. 
74 Nedkoff, op.cit., p. 28. 
75 Grozdanova, E., op. cit., p. 84. 
76 NBKM, OAK 52/53, on the basis of the data provided by an Ottoman register for 1679-1680, A. 
Velkov has pointed to another specific case, in which for that fiscal year, 379 people in the region of 
Edime were allotted a total of 583 020 akce, namely 1200 akce each to men and 2170 akce each to 
women. "Novi danni zapomohamedanchvane v yugoiztochna Trakia", Vekove, 1986, No. 3, pp. 73-75. 
35 
by the time they had reached formal stability in the mid-seventeenth century the 
formal avariz level was 325 ak\:e per tax house, the nuzal 600.77 
A Zheliazkova has pointed out that, according to information taken from sicil 
registers from Sofia and Bitolya from late 17th century the average value of a town 
house was around 4000 ak\:e, the average value of a village house was only 1720 
ak\:e. 78 Excepts from Sofia sicil defterleri show that an average size house in Sofia 
used to sell for 34 - 40 guru~ m 1709.79 In a sytematic study of the Ottoman Balkan 
city, N. Todorov has provided data, based upon kadi court registers from Vidin, Sofia, 
and Russe, in respect to the prices of houses in the 17th and 18th. centuries. During 
the second half of the 17th c. 65% of the houses in Sofia, 28.5% in Vidin and 55% in 
Russe had prices lower than 5000 akce.8° For the same three towns, 91 to 52 percent 
of the houses (this percentage was diminishing gradually from decade to decade) had 
prices below 100 guru~. 81 Thus, it may easily be seen that even the value of ordinary 
set of clothes amounted to a significant proportion of the price of an average town 
house, and up to half of that of a village one. 
It is hardly possible to prove that people converted only for financial reasons 
on the basis of such documentary evidence, poor people have always existed in the 
village as well as in the city, and the number of arzuhals we have at our disposal is 
too limited to allow us make such blanket generalizations, we can just confine 
ourselves to the contention that the fiscal pressure factor appears possible and logical 
in the context of the documents discussed, being an important element of a whole set 
77 Mc Gowan, B., Economic LJfe in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600 
-1800, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1981, pp. 109-110. The size of an avariz tax house 
could be anything between 3 and 15 households, but nonnally was around 3-4, Ibid., p. 106. 
78 Zheliazkova, A. Raz.prostranenie na Islyama v Zapadno Balkanskite zemi pod Osmanska vlast ( 15-
1 Sti v.), (The Spread of Islam in the Western Balkan Lands under Ottoman Rule, 15-18th c), Sofia: 
BAN, 1990,p. 185. 
79 Fontes Turc1c1 Hzstorzcae Bulgarzcae, vol. VI, pp. 282,284. 
80 Todorov, N. Balkanskiyat grad: XV-XIX vek: sotsialno-ikonomichesko I demografsko razvitie, Sofia: 
Nauka Ilzkustvo, 1972, pp 154-155. 
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of factors which conditioned Balkan Islamisation. What is more important to note 
here is that during the period these arzuhals were drawn up, conversion to Islam 
seemed to have been widely accepted as a fairly easy, prompt, effective, and 
legitimate way of relieving one's financial burden. 
3.3. The Quest for Social Advancement 
Undoubtedly, the alleviation of financial burden resulting from adopting Islam 
was a serious motive. Of no lesser significance, however, was social motivation. The 
adoption of Islam raised the social status of the convert one step up, he moved from 
the ranks of the Christian reaya to those of Muslim reaya. The Muslim had certain 
privileges in his dealings with the administration, he spared himself a number of 
troubles "reserved" for the Christian reaya subjects. Also, in accordance with the 
basic tenets of Islamic law, were not permitted to act as witnesses against Muslims in 
kad1 courts. 
Besides, the very existence as a Muslim made it possible to enter the ranks of 
the askeri class, which meant exemption from reaya taxes. This was not an 
imaginary, but quite real a possibility, in fact. An excellent example for this is to be 
found in the mufassal register for kaza Nevrokop of 1723, where, in the village of 
Musomishte, out of 78 Muslim households, there were 30 yeniceri households, in the 
village of Koprivlen 20 out of 52, in Lyalyovo - 12 of 15, etc; the antroponymical 
analysis shows that these were neither dev~irme recruits nor soldiers from the capital, 
thus reminding of the famous "Bosnian exemption" - the permission given by 
Mehmet II for recruiting "stinnetli" Janissaries, sons of recent converts.82 
81 Ibid. p. 161. 
82 Radushev, "Demografski ... "., p. 80. 
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In this context, the practically countless petitions (especially from the first 
half of the 18th. century), in which new converts asked to be included in a certain 
military corps - a specific Janissary regiment or sipahi, do not come as a surprise. 
Some of the arzuhals strike with the extremely well specified demands of the new 
converts. One asked to be appointed cebeci in the 27th cemaat of the Janissary 
corps83 , another wanted to join the 33rd ocak of the same corps.84 Yet another came 
with all of his family from the village of Razboyna (kaza Eski Cumaya - Modern 
Targovishte in Northern Bulgaria) to collectively convert to Islam and ask so that 
"you appoint me to your illustrious sipahi regiments". 85 Some arzuhals clearly attest 
that the petitioners have been appointed to such positions, but fail to provide us with 
any information in regard to why the specific people were appointed. 86 In other cases 
petitions were drawn up after conversion to Islam and an appointment to the Janissary 
regiments and concern themselves just with the allotment of kisve bahas1, such is the 
case of a man from Eflak who wrote a petition after he accepted Islam in the Sultan's 
presence, was appointed to the bostanc1 corps, but did not get clothes, 87 or a Greek 
appointed to the hospital of the same corps who also was not given clothes initially. 88 
Most of the arzuhals discussed here do not show clearly that the petitioners received 
the positions they demanded. As A. Zheliazkova points out, however, "it is likely that 
the petitioners received the office they wanted or another one, as the Porte needed 
such conscripts, and the practice to address such petitions to the central authorities did 
83 NBKM, OAK 78139. 
84 NBKM, OAK, 3412. 
85 NBKM, lA, 57254, f.l (l l33AH/1720AD). 
86 NBKM, l, 1()<)81, l l 18AH/l706AD, f.5;NBKM, I, 10988, l l21AH/1709AD. 
87 NBKM, l, 11000, f.4(l124AH/1712AD). 
88 NBKM, lA, 57279, f.l (l l34AH/1721AD). 
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not cease for more than 150 years".89 This suggestion sounds quite logical, one 
should not forget, however, that even if a small number of people had been appointed 
to administrative positions, this could have been enough to create the myth that one 
could succeed and to prompt people to petition accordingly. 
Numerous are other petitions that just expressed a desire for the appointment 
to a "relevant" position. Sometimes conversion to Islam was deemed to increase 
one's chances at receiving a miiltezim position - such is the case of a Jew who worked 
at the Imperial minting house and upon conversion to Islam asked to be given a berat 
to manage the mint in exchange of 30,000 ak~e per year.90 
Before discussing such transformations of social status in more detail, it would 
be relevant to say a few words about the respective roles Muslim and zimmis played 
in the socio-economic life in the Ottoman Balkans, and especially in the cities. First, 
it is to be noted that Islam started spreading first in the cities as, on the one hand, it 
was the cities that for natural reasons were the initial object of Ottoman colonization 
and the introduction of Ottoman/Islamic administrative, and religious institutions. On 
the other hand, the cities possessed concentrations of Christians and Jews who were in 
control of considerable financial capitals and were interested in preserving their 
leading social positions. 91 
The spread of Islam among local Balkan city elites on a large scale developed 
first in Bosnia, due to the specific character of the province. Being a border region, it 
occupied a strategic position related to the empire's military campaigns against 
Western European powers. For this reason, many settlements in the region enjoyed 
the special attention of the central Ottoman government, and together with being 
practically developed as strategic urban centers with the introduction and 
89 Zheliazkova, op.cit., p. 186. 
90 NBKM, NPTA XX, 1/28, f. 26(l119AH/1707AD). 
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development of Ottoman institutions, they were promptly raised to the status of 
kasaba as early as in the second half of the 15th century - among these were Yeni 
Pazar, Ustikolina, Sarajevo, and Zvomik.92 Besides, S. Dzaja has pointed to the 
Verweltlichung (secularization) of the Bosnian nobility by that time, largely due to the 
existence of weak church organization in Bosnia in combination with the high degree 
of economic prosperity Bosnian cities had achieved since the beginning of the 15th 
century. 93 This, as it practically meant loose bonds with their previous religion also 
contributed to an easier transition to Islam. 
The specific circumstances in Bosnia put aside, it is widely accepted that the 
early Ottoman colonists in the Balkans lacked the sufficient financial capital to 
engage actively in large scale economic activities. Initially, due also to the specifics of 
the process of mutual adaptation of both the Ottomans and the local population to the 
new political situation, local economic elites were able to maintain leading positions, 
especially in respect to the farming out (iltizam) of state revenues in the Balkan cities. 
As the Ottoman Balkans were gradually transforming from a border zone into a core 
region of a classical Islamic empire, the participation of Muslims in such activities 
started to be favored by the central authorities by the second half of the 16th. 
century.94 From the very beginning of the period of Ottoman domination, it had 
become a practice for many wealthy Jews and Christians to seek partnership with 
Muslims, with the evident objective to stand better chances for being given a mukataa 
lease from the central govemment.95 Thus, the growing Islamic character of the 
Ottoman Balkans prompted two important developments with regard to economic life 
91 Zheliazkova, op.cit., p. 179. 
92 D . . 38 zaJa, op. cit. p. . 
93 Ibid. p. 28. 
94 Zheliazkova, op, cit., p, 179. 
95 Radushev, E., Agramite institutsii v Osmanskata imperia prez XVII-XVIII vek, Sofia: Akademichno 
Izdatelstvo "Prof. M. Drinov", 1995, p. 45. 
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in the Balkan Ottoman cities: first, obviously a good number of zimmi capital holders 
were stimulated to convert in order to preserve their economic leverage, and second, 
many free-born Muslims, acting initially as intermediaries (partners) between non-
Muslim capital holders and the central government, had started acquiring substantial 
financial capital, which gradually enabled them to engage themselves alone in large 
scale economic activities. What is most important in respect to our discussion, is that 
by the end of the 16th century the zimmi element had been pushed out by the newly 
forming Muslim political and economic elites.96 Similar pressures were active in 
respect to artisans and merchants. In addition to being at disadvantage as payers of 
cizye, zimmi artisans often suffered from disloyal competition on behalf of Muslim 
craftsmen who benefited from their membership in guilds that were Islamic in 
character (headed by a ~eyh, they also entailed certain missionary and proselytizing 
activities) and managed at times to take advantage in getting state orders.97 This 
predominance of the Muslim element in the socio-economic life in the Balkan city, 
would last until the second half of the 17th century, when zimmi merchants (Greeks, 
Armenians, and Jews) gradually started to play a definitive role within the context of 
the integration of the empire (and more specifically, its European provinces) into the 
world economy. Thus, being a Muslim was obviously an essential advantage in the 
socio-economic life of the Balkan cities in the period the above discussed petitions 
refer to. 
As it was shown above, the desire to be appointed to various regiments of the 
Janissary corps was manifest in a great number of petitions. In order to provide a 
viable explanation of this phenomenon, it should be noted that by the mid-17th century 
several important changes had occurred in the corps's functional nature as well as in 
96 Mutafchieva, V., "Otkupuvaneto na darzhavnite prihodi v OsManskata imperia prez XV-XVII v. I 
razvitieto na parichnite otnoshenia", Istoricheski Pregled, No. 1, p. 56. 
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respect to its composition. First, as early as by the beginning of the 17th century the 
Janissary corps had lost its viability as a foremost military unit which played decisive 
role in imperial military campaigns. Instead, it already resembled a Pretorian guard 
which dominated politics in the capital. The members of the six regiments of the 
Porte (the kap1kulus) had been instrumental in influencing imperial policies, and 
played a key role with regard to the deposition of a number of Sultans, like Osman II 
(1618-1622), and later Ibrahim (1640-1648) and Mehmed IV (1648-1687). Besides, 
the traditional method of recruitment through dev~irme had largely withered, it had 
started to be infiltrated by people that had little to do with the military profession -
enterpreneurs, merchants, tax farmers, artisans. 98 All this is to be understood in the 
context of the increasing settlement of Janissaries in the provincial urban centers 
(initially in the function of guardians of the Sultan's authority) and the privileges and 
opportunities that the Janissary status offered in the economic life of the empire. The 
salary which the Janissaries received regularly, together with their being exempted 
from taxes, provided them with the opportunity to engage in usury and further 
increase their wealth.99 Certain Janissaries, kethuda-yeri (local commanders of the 
kapzkulu sipahi), or the serdars, for example could act in the capacity of emins 
(government agents) and miiltezims (tax-farmers), and be instrumental in the 
collection of taxes. 100 Janissaries were given special privileges at certain mukataa 
auctions where the collection of certain taxes like resm-i agnam (sheep tax), cizye, 
avariz and nuzul were farmed out by the central government. 101 Often, given that they 
possessed sufficient knowledge of local economic conditions, they acted as tax 
farmers in alliance (ber vech-i i~tirak) with high ranking officials who provided in 
97 Zheliazkova, op.cit., p. 180. 
98 Radushev, Agramite institutsii, p. 52. 
99 Akdag, M. 'Genel cizgileriyle XVII. Yiizyll Tiirkiye Tarihi', TAD, vol. 4, No. 6-7, p. 203. 
100 Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal transformation'', p. 291. 
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their turn, viable political support. Also, Janissaries were often given the right to 
administer as emins ocaklzk mukataas (tax-farms, whose income was allocated 
directly to the maintenance of a provincial Janissary unit). 102 
By the mid-171h century, Janissaries had also started to play a considerable role 
in agriculture, first as multezims of agrarian mukataas, and later as riftlik (large farm) 
owners, as they were in a position to seize miri lands and appropriate certain fiscal 
prerogatives of the central authorities, as well as to extort (through usury) land from 
indebted peasants, and attracted the latter to their farms as paid workers, providing 
them the apposite protection. 103 Janissaries started entering the ranks of the city 
guilds performing protective functions and buying gedik (the right to ownership of an 
artisan's shop (dukkan)). 104 
Thus, "in the seventeenth century, emerging as a dominant group in the 
Ottoman cities and towns, the kapzkulus soon extended their control over agricultural 
lands as well as over provincial trade ... not only did they enjoy a leading position in 
urban socio-economic life, they also became a determining factor in urban politics, 
and, with the weakening of the authority of the central government, their role as 
representatives of local autonomy in the provinces became increasingly 
prominent". 105 
In the context of the above outlined changes in the nature of the Janissary 
corps, as the dev~irme system was practically dead and the (male) Muslim-Turkish 
element in the Balkans was declining demographically due to heavy war losses, 106 it is 
not difficult to understand this mass drive to enter the Janissary corps on behalf of 
101 Radushev, Agramite institutsii, p. 52. 
102 Ib"d 64 I ., p. . 
103 Georgieva, Tsvetana, Enicherstvoto v bukgarskite zemi, Sofia, 1989, pp. 116-130. 
104 Todorov, op.cit., p. I 17. 
105 Inalcik, "Miltary and Fiscal transformation", p. 291. 
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new converts. One can imagine the psychological effect upon the non-Muslim payer 
of the poll-tax when the collector appeared to be a recent convert, and often his fellow 
countryman - the newly converted Janissary served as an example how nice it is to be 
a Muslim in this world, holding a state administrative position on top of this107. 
In some cases conversion to Islam was used as a way to drastically change 
one's social position - such are the stories of the above mentioned sailor who was 
released from slave work on the imperial galleys (to where he was sent after being 
accused of murder) and a prisoner of war captured by the Ottomans in the Battle of 
Belgrade ( 1717) and shared the same fate until he converted. 108 
Of special interest are some arzuhals written on behalf of Westerners, 
especially those who converted in their desire to join the Ottoman army as officers or 
experts. A typical example in this respect is the petition on behalf of Venetian, who 
was subsequently given a full set of clothes. In an additional entry in his petition for 
conversion to Islam one can read a special resolution of the Grand Vizier to the head 
of the bombardier corps Ahmed Bey to find a "relevant job" for the new convert.109 
The same Ahmed Bey --previously Claude Alexander, Count De Bonneval who 
served both with Louis XIV and with Eugene of Savoy, came to the Ottoman Empire, 
converted to Islam, and concentrated his energy on the organization of the bombardier 
corps which he managed according to Austrian and French methods until his death in 
17 4 7 .110 In a finnan that is preserved in Sofia archives, a daily stipend of 1300 akc;e 
was allotted to Count De Bonneval. 111 This hardly suggests that the former Austrian 
106 Sugar, P., Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-18()4., Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press, 1977, p. 222. 
107 Radushev, op.cit. p. 81. 
108 NBKM, OAK, 43/45, f.l (l l31AH/1719AD). 
109 NBKM, I, 11111, f. l (1145AH/1732AD). 
110 Jelavich, B., History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983, p. 116. 
111 NBKM, OAK 13/46, published by B Nedkov in Arabic script in his Osmanoturska diplomatika 1 
paleografia, Vol. 2, Sofia, 1972, pp. 73-74. 
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general converted to Islam from purely spiritual motives, moreover it implies that the 
actual sincerity of the conversion did not unduly occupy the Ottomans, particularly 
when it was a matter of skilled elements joining the ranks. 
3.4 Religious influences 
After all these examples have been presented it is relevant to turn to some 
more general issues related to conversion as represented in the documents discussed 
above. Above all the presented petitions do not provide cogent evidence of forcible 
Islamisation (which does not of course mean that examples of it did not exist at all). 
Every religion willingly encouraged proselytism, it was so in the Ottoman state too. 
Conversion, however, was rarely a result of coordinated state policy and remained a 
matter of religious zeal at the communal level. There existed other factors that made 
conversion more acceptable in the eyes of new converts. Among these the most 
important were the state of local Orthodox and Catholic Churches, folk Christianity, 
as well as the role of religious syncretism and crypto Christianity. 
In this context, the state of the Balkan (Orthodox) churches under Ottoman 
rule appears to be of paramount importance. We would agree to S. Dzaja that it was 
not only Christian heterodoxy (folk Christianity and heresies), but also, and probably 
to a greater extent, weak church organization per se, that facilitated the spread of 
Islam in the Ottoman Balkans. 112 Although Dzaja propounded his argument in 
respect to 15-161h c. Bosnia in particular, it would not be that problematic to sustain 
such an argument in view of the Ottoman Balkans in general and extend it over a 
significantly broader time span. Balkan historians usually agree that the local parish 
was the micro-world of Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule. Expulsion from it 
(upon conversion to Islam) practically meant the often painful severance of decades -
112 Dzaja, S.M., Kon.fessionalitat und Nationalitat Bosniens und der Herzegowina, Munich: R. 
Oldenborg, 1984, p. 40. 
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long, viable social links and required that new convert to search for a new religious 
identity and socio-religious status within the local Muslim community, which, for its 
part not always accepted convertites without reserves. 
This said, one is to address the questions of the cohesiveness of local Christian 
communities, the density of the parish and monastery networks in various parts of the 
Balkans, the availability of priests and the level of their respective professional 
education - these are all factors, which related to the capability of the Orthodox 
church to prevent individual as well as mass conversion to Islam. The information we 
have got from Western travelers at various points of time appears quite useful in 
respect to any attempts at casting more light on this problematics. The Austrian 
traveler Simpert Niegel, who passed through the Bulgarian lands in 1699- 1700, 
informs us of a case in which a still unbaptised four-year old child of Orthodox 
parents in a village near Y anbolu received baptism from a Catholic priest due to the 
lack of Orthodox priests in the region. 113 S. Gerlach (second half of 16th c. ) asserted 
that an Orthodox priest served on average between 6 and 10 villages in Ottoman 
Bulgaria, 114 and the Russian traveler V. Barskii (early 181h. C.) set this number at 5-
6. u5 In towns, parishes were not always territorially compact either, the number of 
Christian quarters (mahalles) often being much higher than that of churches. 
In her comprehensive study of the Bulgarian church under Ottoman rule 0. 
Todorova has utilized Ottoman detailed tax registers in her attempt to present a 
systematic picture of the ecclesiastical network in various parts of the Balkans, with 
special respect to the number of Orthodox priests in juxtaposition to that of 
households and villages they served. 
113 Nemski I avstriiski patepisi za Balkanite XVII - sredatea na XVIII vek, M. Ionov, ed., Sofia, 1986, p. 
201 
114 Gerlach, S., Dnevnik na edno patuvane do Osmanskata porta v Tsarigrad, B. Tsvetkova and M 
Kiselincheva, eds., Sofia, 1976, p.256. 
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Thus, only 45% of the villages in the vilaet of Veles had their own priests in 
1445, this percentage was 37 for the region of Sofia in the 3rd quarter of the 15th c., 
32 for the sancak of Vidin during the second half of the 16th c., 9 for the kaza of 
Petrich in 1665, and 37 for the kaza of Tirnovo in the late 17th-early 18th. cc., 
respectively. Although Todorova acknowledged certain shortcomings in regard to the 
reliability of the specific Ottoman sources she had utilized, she did not fail to point to 
the very low percentages for Northeastern Bulgaria and establish a positive 
relationship between the latter and the wave of large-scale Islamisation in this region 
over the whole period of Ottoman rule. u 6 
All this said, it is worthy to note that, beside their numerical scarcity in a 
number of cases, Orthodox priests were quite often poorly educated in respect to even 
certain basic tenets of the Christian doctrine, which had its related effect upon the 
religious consciousness of their parishioners. The Jesuit scholar R. Boshkovitch, who 
passed through the Balkans in 1762 informs us of a parish priest in a big village in the 
vicinity of Varna, who was so ignorant that he asked him whether there were priests 
in Rome and scolded him for not wearing a beard. m Two centuries earlier, Gerlach 
drew a similar picture - the villagers in the village of Semische (near Khaskovo. 
Haskoy) "did not know what the village priest was doing during liturgy... he had not 
taught them neither the Lord's Prayer, nor the Ten Commandments, nor anything else, 
so that among 1000 Christians, no one knew them ... they just knew they were 
Christians. 118 
In addition to the poor education of priests, and the scanty knowledge of the 
Orthodox doctrine on the part of most Christians, especially in the rural areas, it is 
115 cited in 0. Todorova, Pravoslavnata tsarkva i Balgarite XV-XVIII vek, Sofia, 1997, p. 78. 
116 Todorova, 0, op.cit. pp. 83-86. 
117 Boshkovitch. R., "Dnevnik na edno patuvane'', M. Todorova, ed., Sofia, 1975, p.55 
118 Gerlach, op.cit., p. 257. 
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relevant to mention folk-Christianity and popular heresies as a factor for conversion. 
Although Bulgaria, Serbia, and Byzantium appeared to be predominantly Orthodox at 
the time of the Ottoman conquest, this assumption was only true "in terms of the 
formal institutional life of the Balkan Orthodox churches, it is invalid for the folk 
culture of the inhabitants of these three medieval states", as "the religious life of the 
Orthodox masses resided on a foundation which was heavily influenced by their 
pagan roots". 119 Through the countless political and religious changes in the long 
history of the Balkans, the peasant's way of life changed remarkably little and various 
customs and cults of pagan origin like those toward fertility, the tree, or the house 
snake as the protective spirit of the hearth continued to have their place in village life 
- "consequently the popular religion of the Balkan peoples, even in modem times, 
displays many pronounced archaic features which predate the appearance of both 
Islam and Christianity in the Balkans". 120 
It is also worth mentioning that at least in some regions, religious strife also 
played a significant role in weakening the Christians' religious affiliation. The most 
characteristic example is that of Albania, where the religious split between the 
Northern, predominantly Catholic, and the Southern, Orthodox, part of the country 
left indelible marks in the religious worldview of the Albanians, the continuous strife 
between the Papacy and the Patriarchate of Constantinople helped in blurring their 
religious views and in alienating them from the church. 121 
Again, we are far from absolutizing the significance of all this in respect to 
Islamisation, but, anyway, deem it an important element of a broader set of factors 
which conditioned the spread of Islam in the Ottoman Balkans. 
119 Vryonis, S., "Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans, 14th -16th Centuries", in Aspects of the 
Balkans: continuity and change, H. Birnbaum and S. Vryonis, eds., The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 
1972, p. 154. 
120 Ibid., pp.154-156. 
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Orthodox Christians also resorted often to Islamic kad1 courts in relation to 
various cases which were formally in the competence of local parish courts as well. 
The Ottoman state had acknowledged the right of the Christian Church to administer 
justice, more specifically in cases related to family law. Non-Muslims, however, 
were not prohibited to go to kad1 courts to bring suits against each other, or to settle 
disputes, and register changes in family status. Court fees at kad1 courts were often 
lower that those at parish courts; thus, this could be considered a factor that 
encouraged non-Muslims to seek the services of purely Islamic institutions, which, in 
turn contributed to their estrangement from the local parish community and presented 
Islamic institutions as a (preferred) alternative to Christian ones. Thus, in the Land 
Code of 1609 the marriage fee at the kad1 court was set at 25 ak~e, the corresponding 
fees in the archbishopric of Ohrida for 1st, 2°d, and 3rd marriage, were 80, 160, and 
240 ak~e in 1633, 40, 80, and 120 ak~e in 1638, and 100, 200, and 300 ak~e in 1669, 
respectively. 122 If we follow standard estimates of the rate of the value of the silver 
ak~e at different point of time in Ottoman history, we shall see that parish court fees 
were significantly higher (often twice as much) than those at kad1 courts.123 
Apart from this, the Serial was more lenient in its treatment of marriage and 
divorce - it was not that strict in respect to marriage between relatives, allowed 
marriage between people of different faith (especially between a Muslim husband and 
a non-Muslim wife), and was far more loose on divorce. 
As far as the nature and the role of Muslim dervish missionaries and their 
orders is concerned, it should be pointed out that no indications of their influence 
could be derived from the above discussed petitions. Given that the arzuhals were 
121 Zheliazkova, op.cit. 193. 
122 Todorova, 0., op. cit., pp. 164-5. 
123 See Pamuk, S. "Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326 - 1914", inalcik and Quataert, eds., An Social 
and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, vol 11, pp. 963-4. 
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submitted with the very aim to be awarded a financial grant, and the texts of the 
petitions, relates to financial and socio-economic motives, we are not in a position to 
satisfactorily determine the extent to which, Islamic syncretism was influential in 
respect to the petitioners' decision to accept Islam. True, one could object that the 
above discussed weakened state of the local Balkan churches is not supported by 
evidence to be found in the petitions. However, there exists a marked difference in 
the nature of these two factors and in the way they influenced the mindset of a 
potential convert. While the church factor (together with folk Christianity) played a 
general role in preparing the soil for conversion to another religion, be it a genuine 
spiritual transformation or only a socio-political and economic expediency, and thus 
influenced the process of Islamisation only indirectly, it deserves our attention 
without necessarily being manifest in the above discussed documents. The role of the 
Heterodox Islamic missionaries, on the other hand, was related to influencing a non-
Muslim to make a specific religious choice, the dervish orders were active in specific 
regions and affected specific people, at a specific time. The format of this study does 
not allow for detailed analysis of dervish missionary activities in the Balkans, and 
even if that was possible, any attempt to directly relate Islamic syncretism to the 
petitions discussed here would be far-fetched. For these reasons, we will confine 
ourselves to briefly outlining some of the heterodox orders' most important 
characteristics in order to give an idea what role they could possibly have played. 
Their mystical ritual was more attractive, it fed people's hopes for contact 
with the other world, it healed them, and promised salvation from worldly life. 
Islamic orthodoxy was related to a lot of prohibitions and mystical orders were prone 
to absorb specific elements from other confessions, as for them the road to God was 
one for all. As P. Sugar put it: "the dervishes wandered almost constantly preaching 
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and practicing their tarikat and numerous related ceremonies. They were the babas, a 
sort of combination of holy man, miracle worker, medicine man, etc., and were often 
regarded as living saints. Their ecclectism and pragmatism knew practically no 
bounds. Given the numerous similarities between folk-Christianity and folk-Islam, 
they had no difficulty in fitting local customs into their tarikats. . . It was not difficult 
for Christians whose faith was of the superstitious folk variety to pass over to a 
similar but more secure folk versions of Islam.". 124 
Heterodox orders such as those of Bekta§i and Mevlevi were in fact heretical 
in contents, but Orthodox by declaration, as seen by the central authorities. Despite 
their syncretic practices, the central government saw in dervish orders an instrument 
for further expansion and consolidation, the close link between some orders and 
certain Ottoman institutions, e.g. between the Bekta§i order and the Janissaries was 
tacitly recognized by the government. 
Cryptochristianity presented people who sought to escape their socio-
economic plight with a much more direct alternative. As many people, especially in 
the countryside, were forced to adopt Islam under the increasing pressure of fiscal 
burden, the local church (both Orthodox and Catholic) was often prone to continue 
recognizing them as its members. Thus, these "double believers" tried to preserve 
their true religion behind the facade of Islam, which gave them a number of socio-
economic advantages. The fact that to-be converts knew of the possibility to practice 
cryptochristianity, was certainly a factor that additionally predisposed many of them 
in making their decision to convert. As an essentially post-conversion practice, 
however, cryptochristianity will be discussed in the next chapter, with special 
124 Sugar, op.cit., pp. 53-54. 
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attention being paid to the way it was viewed by the Ottoman government as well as 
the Islamic legal tradition. 
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Chapter 4.:Post-conversion Practices. The Attitude of the Ottoman State and 
Islamic Legal Tradition toward Converts 
In this last chapter, we will discuss post-conversion issues and practices 
characteristic for a new convert, the Ottoman state and the local community, as well 
as the question of use of force in converting people, and the general attitude of both 
the Ottoman state and Islamic law towards conversion and new converts. 
As an essentially post-conversion practice cryptochristianity was not discussed 
in the previous chapter. Still, it should be said that, as potential converts were most 
probably aware of the existing possibilities to practice it, it also may well be 
considered as a factor that facilitated conversion, as it presented people who sought to 
escape their socio-economic plight with a direct alternative. As many people, 
especially in the countryside, were induced to adopt Islam under the increasing 
pressure of fiscal burden, the local church (both Orthodox and Catholic) was often 
prone to continue recognizing them as its members. Thus, these "double believers" 
tried to preserve their true religion behind the facade of Islam, which gave them a 
number of socio-economic advantages. It was of crucial importance that Islamic law 
ruled out the possibility for a convert to return back to his previous religion. Thus, 
even if conversion was just meant to be overt, an irreversible process of assimilation 
started. It was further strengthened by certain/etvas issued by Ottoman Seyhulislams 
such as that of Abdurrahim Efendi, which ruled that Muslims should not talk in 
infidel tongues unless this was really unavoidable. 125 Thus, even if a new convert was 
practically continuing to practice his previous religion, his/her children and 
grandchildren were born as Muslims, their link to their grandfathers' religion 
125 Dani~mend, 1.H., Tarihi Hakikatler, Cilt II, Istanbul, 1979, p.661. 
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progressively weakened. Thus, there existed a whole range of transitional stages, of 
religious syncretism, which combined in different degrees old beliefs and practices 
with Islam. 126 This was probably also sensed by Ottomans who ostensibly did not 
bother that much with the sincerity of new converts but probably realized the 
inevitability of gradual conversion from generation to generation. 
The very existence of a considerable number ofjetvas addressing apostacy and 
pre-conversion (i.e. non Muslim) practices on behalf of neophytes in the authoritative 
fetva collections of such prominent Ottoman :)eyhiilislams like Ali <;atalcah Efendi 
and Abdurrahim Efendi, whose terms of office were in the late 17th. and the early 18th 
centuries respectively, is a clear indication that the issues of apostacy and 
cryptochristianity (at least partly) were extant. It is characteristic of fetva collections 
that "the overriding concern of the authors of this works was the incorporation of law 
cases that were relevant and needed at the time and age in which they were writing ... 
this is evidenced . . . in the untiring insistence of virtually all authors on the necessity 
to include in their works cases that are deemed to be relevant to contemporary needs 
and that are of wide occurrence (ma ta'ummu bihi al-balwa}, and to exclude those that 
have ceased to be of relevance of the community and its needs". 127 
In the fetva collections of both Seyhulislams, one may find standard fetvas 
regarding apostacy, as well as such addressing a case of a neophyte behaving as a and 
infidel and refusing to stop doing so upon request, 128 or Muslims' attending the 
wedding ceremony of fellow zimmis and playing with them traditional (non-Muslim) 
dances129. In the first case Abdurrahim Efendi ruled that apostacy regulations should 
126 Dimitrov, S., "Skritoto Hristianstvo i islyamizatsionnite protsesi v Osmanskata darzhava" 
(Cryptochristianity and the lslamisation Processes in the Ottoman State), lstoricheski Pregled, 1987, 
No. 3, p. 20. 
127 Hallaq, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 
128 Abdurrahim Efendi, Fetawa-i Abdurrahim, Der-i Saadet, 1243, p. 70, No. 4. 
129 <;atalcah Ali Efendi, Fetawa-i Ali. P. 167, No. I. 
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be put in practice, and in the second Ali Efendi gave an answer to the effect that the 
Muslims who had engaged in the such practices should have their faith and marriage 
"renewed". Suchfetvas show that Islamic legal tradition expressed a marked concern 
in respect to Islam's followers' religious integrity and loyalty to the faith, as well as to 
any violations of the established Islamic rules of social behavior. It should be noted 
however, that in this respect Islam does not constitute an exception as compared to 
other monotheistic religious doctrines (namely Judaism and Christianity). There were 
also fetvas aimed at preventing a recent convert from being harassed by fellow 
zimmis, 130 and such that reprimanded (ta 'zir) for Muslims who approved of Christian 
mores and religious holidays. 131 Similarly, there existfetvas recommending death to a 
zimmi who has insulted the prophet Mohammed. 132 
Such postulates of Islamic legal thought are far from enough, however, to give 
sufficient grounds to authors like S. Dimitrov to contend that "it is an indisputable 
fact that Islam was being spread by force and that the imposition of Islam was the 
work of the Ottoman state" .133 Assuming that the empire possessed sufficient military 
and administrative potential to suppress such phenomena (if it really deemed this 
indispensable), the persistent existence of cryptochristianity well into the 19th c. is an 
indication, by itself, that the Ottoman state was not much concerned with the 
existence of double believers. S. Dimitrov, probably failing to distinguish between 
Islamic tradition and caesaropapism that was characteristic of the Orthodox Christian 
world, also makes the rather blatant assumption that " the Muslim clergy was 
subordinate to the Ottoman state", and thus, the latter was somehow in control of the 
130 o· . S "F . . k " 31 1m1trov, ., etv1 za 1z orenyavane ... , p. . 
131 Abdurrahim, Fetawa, p. 97, No. 6. 
132 Ibid., p. 99, No. 2 .. 
133 Dimitrov, S., "Skritoto hristianstvo'', p. 19. 
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development of Islamic legal thought. 134 One should also bear in mind that f etvas had 
advisory and non-binding character. They could prompt and facilitate due legal 
action, but as the texts of fetvas addressing conversion and apostacy reveal, related 
issues occurred and were dealt with at the communal level. 
Proselytism had always existed at the communal level and it was considered a 
laudable deed on behalf of a Muslim to help bring somebody into the right path. This 
was especially valid for life in the cities where interaction between local zimmi and 
Muslim communities was more intensive and these communities were, often mixed to 
a considerable extent. Excerpts from Sofia kad1 court records reveal that there were a 
lot of cases in which Muslim zimmis and new Muslims lived next to each other and 
engaged in the purchase and sale of real estate property among each other. 135 "Three 
fetvas of the $eyhiilislam Ebussud take for granted that zimmis live adjacent to 
Muslims but preclude them from living immediately adjacent to mosques". 136 
It was fairly normal for a Muslim to manumit a slave who had converted. 
Fetvas show that there obviously were cases in which members of the local Muslim 
community were prone to induce local zimmis to accept Islam. Certainfetvas sanction 
the use of deceit on behalf of Muslims to lure a zimmi into converting, 137 and another 
considers acceptable conversion under the influence of alcohol and rules forcible 
bringing back to Islam an apostate who has converted under such conditions. 138 Still 
even such fetvas do not indicate that forcible conversion to Islam was explicitly 
sanctioned by Islamic law. Force was in fact employed in the case of apostacy, which 
is, however, a situation essentially different from conversion itself. Such were the 
cases of a number of Christian neo-martyrs of whom we know through Orthodox 
134 Ibid., p. 19. 
135 Fontes Tircici Historiae Bulgaricae, vol. 6, pp. 272, 278, 282. 
136 Jennings, R, "Zimmis in Ottoman Records", p. 280. 
137 Abdurrahim, Fetawa, p.72, No. 8. 
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Christian hagiographic literature. In such cases, after conversion the convert became 
subject to intense pressure from the local Christian community to revoke his 
conversion, and consequently was the victim of harassment of local Muslim zealots. 
Historians from the Balkans have often incorrectly viewed such cases as related to 
forcible Islamisation, failing to distinguish between conversion and bringing back to 
Islam after an act of apostacy. 
That members of the local Muslim community, as we as the central authorities 
did not always find new converts to be trustworthy members of the Muslim 
community is revealed in a finnan of Ahmed III to the lwdi of Selanik. In this 
documents it is reported of misuse of power at a fairly low level, on behalf of the 
chief court attendant of the local kadi court, a certain Ishak, a recent convert who tried 
to help two female apostates escape from the local prison where they had been thrown 
in accordance with the prescriptions of Hanefi law with regard to such cases. Besides, 
the finnan discloses that Ishak had appointed a relative of his, Mahmud, another 
recent convert, to the position of chief turnkey of the local prison, who also took part 
in the affair. The decree ends with an order to the effect that converts as well as their 
children be no more appointed to the offices of chief court attendant and chief turnkey 
of the local prison, but these positions be reserved for "trustworthy and pious" 
people. 139 It is noteworthy that although, such posts were not that high in the empire 
as a whole, they were rather significant at the local level, moreover in the case 
presented above all that happened in one of the largest cities of the Ottoman Balkans. 
What this document shows once more is that conversion to Islam did not mean 
by no means severing of the convert's relations with the zimmi community, for whose 
members it was not· obviously abnormal to seek help from recent converts. This is 
138 Ibid., p. 72, No. I. 
139 Petrov, P. Po sledite na nasilieto, pp. 30-31. 
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further reinforced by the fact that zimmis often asked local converts to testify to their 
advantage in court cases against Muslims (as non-Muslims were not allowed to act as 
witnesses against Muslims). 140 Thus, evidence reveals that converts, especially in the 
cities, occupied a middle position between the local Muslim and zimmi communities 
acting as intermediaries between the two, taking advantage of their new social status 
to attain significant posts, and sometimes enjoying the disdain of the Muslims. 
140 Jennings, R., "Zimmis (non-Muslims) in Early 17th c. Ottoman Judicial Records", p. 257. 
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Conclusion 
The present study had taken up the task to discuss certain aspects of Balkan 
Islamisation, in the light of petitions for conversion to Islam in combination with 
other supporting primary sources. 
The above discussed petitions for the conversion of Islam suggest that 
Islamisation was as a gradual process conditioned by various factors, that 
predisposed, or rather pressed new converts to take, at least officially the "Islamic 
path". Conversion was obviously seen by many non-Muslims an effective and secure 
way to financial alleviation and social advancement. The opportunity to practice 
secretly one's previous religion while at the same time enjoying the fiscal and social 
advantages which the status of a Muslim offered, together with the integrating role of 
the Sufi orders made it a lot easier for non-Muslim to make a "compromise" and 
convert to Islam. 
In the specific context of the petitions discussed above fiscal pressure and the 
quest for social advancement should have played a prominent role, as new convert did 
not necessarily have to go to Istanbul to convert, but used this as an opportunity to 
seek certain economic and social advantages. This could be viewed as a form of 
adaptation to the changing political and socio-economic conditions in the empire in 
the second half of the 1 i 11 and the first half of the 18th centuries. During this period, 
Ottoman state and society underwent profound changes in respect to the composition 
of its elites. The degree of social mobility had increased significantly, and the 
boundaries among the various social orders, strictly outlined before were blurred and 
the dev~irme system withered Together with this, the Ottoman Balkan provinces had 
long ago ceased to be border lands, where the Ottomans used to confer a number of 
concessions and privileges to the local non-Muslim population at the time of the 
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conquest, and during the period the petitions refer to, being a Muslim constituted a 
fundamental condition for social advancement. 
The above presented documents date from the second half of l 71h century 
onwards, i.e. fall into during this period of definitive transformation - when the 
dev~irme system withered and the fiscal burden upon non-Muslims (and Muslim 
reaya, in fact) increased significantly. Thus it appears easy to relate conversion (with 
the motives outlined in the above-presented arzuhals) to the changing political and 
socio-economic situation of the Empire in the context of its decline. It remains a 
challenge for future research, however, to explore existing Ottoman archival 
collections in search of more, and more importantly earlier documents of this type (if 
they exist) to explore motivation patterns of Islamisation before the evident pressures 
of decline ever appeared. 
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Appendix 
(transliteration of selected documents) 
Document 1 
NBKM, OAK 76/52, f 19. 
Devletlti ve mtiri.ivvetlti Sultarnm hazretleri sag olsun. 
Bu kullan Eflak ogullardan olub ~eref-i islam ile mii~erref olmak i9tin huzur-u 
saadete geldim merhameten kisve virilmek babmda merhametleri rica olunur. Baki 
ferman sultannnmdtr. 
Bende nev mi.islim. 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Mu'tad tizere bir nefere kisve bahas1 virile. Buyuruldu. 
5 Rebiti' 1-evvel 1097 (30. 01. 1686) 
Document 2 
NBKM, OAK, 76/52, f. 61 (1097AH/1686AD) 
Devletlti ve saadetlti Sultamm Hazretleri sag olsun. 
Bu cariyeniz iki masumu ile ~eref-i islam ile mil~erref olmak i9Lin haki pay1 
~erife geldik mercudurki merhamet olunub kisvemiz sadaka ti ihsan olunmak babmda 
inayet ~erifiniz rica olunur. Ferman sultammmdtr. 
Bende, nev mi.islim 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Mu'tad tizere bir nefer nev mtislime ile iki evlada kisve virile. Buyuruldu. 
'' 
4 Rebiti'l-ahir 1097 (28.02.1686). 
Dokument 3 
NBKM, OAK 76/52, f. 67. 
Saadetlii ve miirilvvetlii Sultamm hazretleri sag olsun. 
Bu kullan azatlanndan olub ~eref-i islam ile mii~erref olmaga huzur-u izzete 
geldim merhameten ve miirur eylemeleri rica olunur. Baki ferman sultammmdlf. 
Ben de 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Mu'tad iizere bir nefere kisve bahas1 virile. Buyuruldu. 
8 Cemaziti' 1-evvel I 097 (02.04.1686). 
Document 4 
NBKM, OAK 76/52, f. 74. 
Saadetlii ve miirilvvetlti Sultamm hazretleri sag olsun. 
Manastir'dan Bulgar oglu olub ~eref-i islam ile mii~erref olmaga geldim 
merhameten kisve virilmek rica olunur. Baki ferman sultammmd1r. 
Bende, nev mtislim. 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Mu'tad tizere bir nefere kisve virile. Buyuruldu. 
9cemaziii'1-evvel 1097 (03.04. 1686). 
Document 5 
NBKM, F. 145, 108. 
Saadethi ve miiriivvetlii Sultamm hazretleri sag olsun. 
t 
Yanbolu'dan Bulgar oglu olub ve iki kar,anda~lanm islam'a gelmi~dir bu 
kullan dahi ~eref-i islam ile mii~erref olmak ic;iin huzur-u izzete geldim merhameten 
kisve virilmek rica olunur. Baki ferman sultammmdlf. 
Bentle, nev mi.islim. 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Mu'tad i.izere bir nev mi.ilsim-i sagire kisvesi virilmek. Buyuruldu. 
9 Cemazii.i'l-evvel 1097 (03.04.1686). 
Document 6 
NBKM, CG 3412, f.3 
Devlethi ve saadetlii Sultamm hazretleri sag olsun. 
,,lv'b 
Bu kullarma ilham-1 rabani£i:11f 1 saadst lti ~eref-i islam ile mii~erref olmaga 
"'°""1.w'f"-• .s.-.da.H "i '2L 
geldim kanun iizere kisvet ii ihsan ve dergah-1 Ali yenic;erileri emrine ilhak eylemek 
niyaz olunur ferman sultan cerrahlar kerhanesine ilhak olunmak babmda. 
Bentle Ahmed. 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Yalmz bir nefere mu'tad iizere kisve virile. Buyuruldu. 
5 Cemazii.i'l-evvel 1116 (05.09. 1704). 
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Document 7 
CG 34/2, f.6. 
Devletlti ve mtiriivvetlti Sultamm hazretleri sag olsun. 
Bu kullan ~eref-i islam ile mti~erref olmak isteriz. Sultandan mercudurki 
yeniyeri ocagma ytrag ve kanun tizere bu iki nefer kullanna yeniyeri kisvesini ihsan 
buyurulmak babmda emr ti ferman sultamm1zmd1r. 
Bende, iki nefer nev milslim. 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Yalmz iki nefer mu'tad tizere kisve virilesiz. Buyuruldu. 
9 cemaziil'l-evvel 1116 (09. 09. 1704) 
Document 8 
NBKM, CG 34/2, f. 21 
Devletlti saadetlti Sultamm hazretleri sag olsun. 
Bu kullan ~eref-i islam ile mti~erref olmak isterim. Kanun tizere kisvem ve iki 
ytiz guru~ kadar dahi deynim olmakla merhameten buyurulub deynim eda olacak 
kadar ihsan keremleri rica olunur. Emr ti ferman merhametlti sultammmdtr. 
Ben de. 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Kanun ilzere bir nefere kisve virile. Buyuruldu. 
28 Receb 1116 (26.11.1704). 
Document 9 
NBKM, NPT A XX 1/28, f.23. 
Devletlu ve muriivvetlu Sultarnm hazretleri sag olsun. 
Rikab-i humayun onunde islam ile mu~erref olub devamlii saltanat1mm rica olunurk[ 
cebehane ocagma 91rak buyurub kanun uzere mukemmel kisve ve sadaka ile murur 
buyurulmak babmda ferman. 
Bende nev miislim. 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Mucebince kanun tizere bir nefere kisve virilmek. Buyuruldu. 
29 Saban 1118 (16. 12. 1706). 
Document 10 
NBKM, 1 A, 57348, f. l. 
Devletlu ve merhamethi Sultarnm hazretleri sag olsun. 
Bu iki nefer kullan Kumani9eli olub kalbimiz tulu' itmekle mi.i~erref olmak 
i9un haki pay1 saadete hal idub geldik. Mercudurki kanun uzere iki nefere kisve 
bahalanm1z virilmek babmda ferman-1 ali rica olunur ferman sultamm1zmd1r. 
Bentle, iki nev mi.islim kullan. 
Resolution of the Grand Vizier: 
Mucebince iki nefer nev muslim kisve bahas1 virilmek. Buyuruldu. 
14 Safer 1 143 (29. 08. 1730) 
Resolution of the Ba~defterdar: 
Tezkiresi virile 
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Notification of the Ba~muhasebe: 
Tezkire dade. 
19 Safer 1143 (03. 09. 1730). 
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